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  The article deals with the constitutional courts (CCs) of the Kingdom of 
Thailand and the impact they they have and had on the political order and vice 
versa. Especially the present CC, introduced by the 2007 Const. after a military  
coup d´ état in 2006 against then Prime Minister (PM) Thaksin, attracted attention 
when it terminated in 2009 two subsequent governments of his political camp 
which came to power again after the first post-coup elections. It is the ongoing 
conflict between these two camps, the “red” camp of ousted PM Thaksin, 
perceived to be a threat for the established role of the monarchy and those who 
defend this role, the “yellow” camp, which forms the background against which 
the CC’s performance often was explained. In fact, the conflict is not only about 
a disputed political leader and the preparations of his coming back, but about the 
basic conflict how the country shall be governed. Latest since demonstrations of 
the “red” camp have been cracked down violently by the then “yellow” 
government in 2010 the opposition against the established constitutional system 
became a fundamental one. The “yellow” government came to power following 
the above mentioned CC’s impeachment of a “red” PM and the dissolution of his 
political party. After the “red” camp gained an overwhelming majority in 
parliament with the second post-coup elections again, the new government 
introduced the plan for a major constitutional reform. The reform threatened to 
redefine the role of the CC and was provisionally stopped recently by an 
injunction order of the CC. Main reason was that it could not be excluded that the 
reform would not change the basic structure of the constitution which is formed by 
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the sublime and differentiated role the monarchy plays in it. Interesting is, how 
important not only the overall performance of the present CC seems to be defined 
by its function to protect this basic structure but the whole idea of constitutional 
review in Thailand including the previous CC under the const. of 1997 which has 
been abolished by the coup of 2006. The very concept of constitutionalism in 
Thailand and its challenge by a particular leader on the one hand and a 
competing concept of constitutionalism on the other seems to be a key to a 
substantial understanding of constitutionalism and the function and performance of 
constitutional review in Thailand at heart. The first one of these competing 
concepts of constitutionalism is the very Thai concept which integrates elective 
mechanisms in a system which is very much defined by the role of the 
monarchy. It is facing an emancipating concept of elective democracy which 
firstly gave the populism of then PM Thaksin ground while it received a more 
universalistic stance in the interpretation of parts of the “red-shirts”, a street based 
protest movement, allied with Thaksin but not identical with his political party. 
Elective democracy, according to all Thai constitutions, has to be framed by the 
autochthon Thai concept to which it is subordinated. The thesis for this study is 
that it was one of the key functions of both CCs to discipline this concept. 
Insofar mission and design of constitutional review in Thailand responded to 
widespread misuses, namely in form of vote buying, as well as a political 
narrative reinforcing its destructive potential in contrast to the essence of the 
positive counter － narrative of Thai-style democracy. The latter is forming not 
only forming the basic structure all Thai constitutions in recent decades and in 
the same time also a political narrative with historical, cultural, religious and class 
－ orientated implications which could be described as the － historically contingent 
and conceptually fluid － very Thai version of the so called ‘Asian values’. While 
the first CC functioned very well in disciplining elective democracy by using its 
far reaching powers to dissolve political parties and disqualify politicians, it failed 
to do so, when mega politics have been affected in person of then PM Thaksin. 
After his populist based regime was aborted by the coup, the present CC became 
the decisive force to fulfill the same mandate proactively especially in cases 
pertaining to mega-politics. 
A. Introduction
  The present study deals with the impact Constitutional Courts (CCs)1) had on 
Thailand’s political order and vice versa. Even if this is a wide topic, a lot of 
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what may be said about it can be understood along some few conceptual lines 
marking the underlying constitutional discourse.
  To trace them, it is necessary to widen the perspective from a mere textual 
description of the institution and some landmark decisions to the context of Thai 
constitutionalism, conceptual discursive and political.2) Is the contextual argument 
generally useful for the constitutional analysis as observing the intersection of law 
and politics, it is in particular for an understanding of the Thai realities. Legal 
governance in Thailand is here much less a distinct and dominating feature in the 
ordering of the political and commanding a much lower reach and density than it 
may claim it in classical countries like the US or Germany. Other, non-legal 
systems of order, one may think of all facets of familism, be it a “moral” or 
“immoral” one3), have more relative weight and are informing the concept and 
application of (consitutional) law in a distinct and different way. The fact that 
legal commands of the constitution regulate the political order with a comparatively 
limited impact only corresponds at least with two interrelated phenomena which 
contribute to the relative difference between a political system like the Thai and a 
stronger law-dominated one. Firstly the scholarly doctrine of constitutional law is 
less geared with the practice of constitutional review and thus not helping to 
improve and stabilize, criticize and legitimize the court’s performance as could be 
expected from the fact that it is representing a generally impressively differentiated 
legal science. On the other hand the performance of the CC is not so much 
1) There have been two in the last fourteen years which both will be regarded in this 
article.
2) See Andrew Harding, Peter Leyland, The Constitutional System of Thailand. A 
Contextual Analysis, Oxford and Portland 2011, p.177; from a German point of view 
Christoph Möllers, “Legalität und Legitimation des Bundesverfassungsgerichts”, in: 
Matthias Jestaedt, Oliver Lepsius, Christoph Möllers, Christoph Schönberger (eds.), Das 
entgrenzte Gericht. Eine kritische Bilanz nach sechzig Jahren Bundesverfassunsgericht, 
Berlin 2011, p.283.
3) See Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, Chicago 1958. The 
term is meant widely to describe norms emerging from social structures related to or 
formed according the model of the family. It is including highly legitimized forms of 
paternalism as well as wide spread and diverse forms of patron-client relationships, 
brotherhoods and networks of alliances etc.
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providing a steady impetus for the continuous development of political and 
constitutional life in terms of an ongoing process of constitutionalization. Not so 
much the continuous adjustments and concretizations of constitutional law are the 
sign of the CC’s performance but the exercise of a corrective mandate which is 
enforced in single cases which are less connected by doctrine or a sense for 
precedents than in western systems. This is furthermore due to the different 
function of CCs within their constitutional system and to the fact that Thai CCs 
are in general representing an ensemble of quite fragmented constitutional powers 
within a system of multiple normative orders. Thai constitutional law and decisions 
of Thai CCs are nevertheless not only potentially powerful symbols but also sharp 
swords as the case arises, especially in certain significant fields of governance. 
Performing constitutional law Thai CCs are following the same behavioral and 
institutional patterns like other CCs while their function is defined by a very 
specific concept of good governance being essential for the understanding of the 
contemporary and future performance of the CC of Thailand.  
  The first chapter shall introduce in the development and structure of the two 
CCs in the context of this concept of good governance. Following, the court’s 
performance will be analyzed in some selected aspects which may reveal some 
patterns of continuity and change in Thai constitutionalism against the background 
of the basic understanding of good governance provided dominantly by the 
subsequent constitutions. Finally, actual challenges and problems of The Thai CCs 
as resulting from their performance will be reflected with special respect of the 
ongoing constitutional crisis triggered by a very recent order of the CC to the 
parliament to halt an initiated process of amending the constitution.
B. Institutional Development, Concepts and Organizational Structure
  To understand the impact of constitution al review on the political order and 
vice versa it is useful to reflect structure and performance of the two Thai CCs 
on the historical development of constitutional review and the basic concepts of 
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constitutionalism informing its function. Historical development, concepts of 
constitutionalism and positioning of the CCs are subject of the first part of this 
chapter (A. I.), the organizational structure of the second part (A. II.) before the 
performance of the CCs will analyzed in the following chapter (B.). 
I. Development: Historical Aspects, Functional Background, Positioning
  The historical development of constitutional review in Thailand offers an 
interesting and wide field, which will be reflected here very selectively with 
respect of the CCs performance and as being related to the underlying concepts of 
constitutionalism in Thailand. Meanwhile, there are in fact two partly competing 
concepts of constitutionalism which are informing the course and functional 
background of constitutional review for the role of constitutional review in 
Thailand is also the fact that CCs never really gained a comparable authority as 
the Supreme Court. 
  1. Historical development and relation to other constitutional players
  In historical perspective neither the idea of constitutional review nor that of a 
specialized institution concerned with some constitutional control powers is new 
for Thailand.4) Nevertheless, legal review has never become a mechanism exercised 
on a regular basis by the ordinary courts nor have the specialized Constitutional 
Tribunals prior to the 1997 Const.5) achieved any constitutional relevance. Thus, 
4) After World War II in which Thailand has been allied to Japan the post - war 
government enacted a War Crime Act B.E. 2488 which regulated punishable war 
crimes for the past. Within the context of shifting political circumstances the Supreme 
Court in decision 1/2489 held that the War Crime Act B.E. 2488, in particular related 
to a punishment of crimes defined retroactively was unconstitutional and therefore null 
and void. Even before, with the second Thai constitution B.E. 2489 a Constitutional 
Tribunal had been introduced an institution which came again with subsequent 
constitutions, but never became practically relevant. See for Indonesia Daniel S. Lev, 
“Between State and Society: Professional Lawyers and Reform in Indonesia”, in 
Timothy Lindsey (ed.), Indonesia: Law and Society, Sydney 1999, pp.48, 53. This is 
different for example from Indonesia, where legal/constitutional review has been 
introduced not before 2003.
5) The 1997 Const. was the 16
th
 constitution after the revolution in 1932.
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even if the idea was not new, the regular practice of constitutional review and its 
organization by a specialized CC with strong review powers has been introduced 
with the Const. of 1997. This quality of being a newly designed institution with a 
wide range of competences and the context of the 1997 Const. which was widely 
perceived as a watershed in the political development of the country caused the 
general impression of a promising beginning for the court. However, the introduction 
of a specialized CC was the result of heavy discussions in the Constitution 
Drafting Assembly (CDA). Formation, design, and composition of the new institution 
were subject of fierce debate and some changes.6) This kind of attention was not 
given to the composition of the second CC, which was established after the coup 
6) Against the fact that the Thai public law is strongly influenced by French and German 
law ᐨ while the general practice of legal application is also influenced by common law 
trained judges ᐨ the new constitution and the institution of the new CC presented a 
combination of different models and some own accents, the latter in particular concerning 
the dealing with elective democracy. Generally the CC represented a combination of 
French (a-priori review of draft legislation) and German models (organ dispute, concentrated 
review with a right of ordinary courts to require review etc.). See for the comparatively 
strong appeal of the German model Akaratorn Chularat, “The Legal State. Enforcing 
Good Governance”, in: Law, Constitution Issue 1, Jun. Sept. 2007, p.34, 36ff. Chaowanna 
Traimas and Jochen Hoerth, “Thailand. Another New Constitution as a Way out of the 
Vicious Cycle?”, in: Clauspeter Hill, Jörg Menzel (eds.), Constitutionalism in Southeast 
Asia, Vol. 2, Singapore 2008, pp.287, 308. For the strong influence of the German 
model of constitutional review in general see Donald P. Kommers, “Can German 
Constitutionalism Serve as a Model for the United States?” in: Der Staat, Vol. 37 (1998), 
pp.335, 336; William Rehnquist, “Verfassungsgerichte-Vergleichende Bemerkungen”, in: 
Paul Kirchhof, Donald P. Kommers (eds.), Deutschland und sein Grundgesetz, 
Baden-Baden 1993, pp.453, 454; Andreas Zimmermann, “Bürgerliche und politische Rechte 
in der Verfassungsrechtssprechung mittel- und osteuropäischer Staaten unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Einflüsse der deutschen Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit”, in: Jochen A. 
Frowein, Thilo Marauhn (eds.), Grundfragen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Mittelund 
Osteuropa, Berlin et al. 1998, pp.89 ff.; Kim Hyo-Jeon, Hundert Jahre Verfassungsrecht in 
Korea und Deutschland. Ein Beitrag zur Rezeptionsgeschichte deutschen Rechts in 
Korea, in: Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts 35 (1985), pp.585-618, Seok Jong-Hyun, 
Die Rezeption des deutschen Verwaltungsrechts in Korea, Berlin 1991; Huh Young, Die 
Grundzüge der neuen koreanischen Verfassung von 1987, in Jahrbuch des öffentlichen 
Rechts 38 (1989), p.565 ff.; Manfred Rehbinder, Sonn Ju-Chan, (eds.), Zur Rezeption 
des deutschen Rechts in Korea, Baden-Baden 1990; Heinrich Scholler, Die Entwicklung 
der Rezeption westlichen Rechts auf die sozialen Verhältnisse in der fernöstlichen 
Rechtskultur, Baden-Baden 1993.
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d’etat of 2006 under the Const. 2007. Contrary to the first CC this court was 
staffed quietly and routinely this time and entered the scene with significant 
different expectations than the first one. To understand continuity and the change 
in the development of constitutional review it is helpful to have a look on both, 
the constitution which set up Thailand’s first CC and the turning point, its 
abolishment by a military coup which was welcome by a majority of Thailand’s 
elite and triggering in the same time a protest movement which should challenge 
the fundaments of power in an unprecedented way. 
  The 1997 Const. emerged from political struggles in the beginning 1990s after 
Thailand’s military based rule had faced a severe legitimacy crisis weakening the 
military and significantly contributing to those of the monarchy. This process 
empowered the middle class and strengthened the civilian elite. In a first move 
resulting in the 1997 Const. conservative forces freeze the equilibrium without too 
much conceptual change in terms of modern constitutionalism preferred to prevent 
any unpredictable dynamics. However, the movement towards a new level of Thai 
constitutionalism had gained already enough impact to enforce a more substantial 
solution. This led to the preparation of the 1997 Const. since 1994. Despite the 
fact that the constitutional project turned out to be the first one of its kind in 
Thai political history which received nationwide attention, the 1997 Const. was far 
away from being a unilateral expression of a homogenous concept of constitutionalism. 
A great deal of misunderstandings about the function and role of the CC is 
attributed to the misleading perception of this fact. What has been described as a 
western-like liberal constitution later on, was in fact a combination of autochthon 
Thai and western elements of constitutionalism and the result of a compromise of 
conservative and reform orientated royalists, established politicians and progressive 
reformers. 
  One of the unusual alliances in this process linked some royalist and the 
progressive forces in their attempt to control the established caste of politicians to 
contribute generally to a higher level of governance. This old civilian power elite, 
political parties and state bureaucracy, had become subject of the legitimacy crisis 
lingering on after the military has stepped aside. They were challenged as being 
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unaccountable and ineffective while defending their interests in preserving power 
heavily.7) Most of the parliamentarians and those royalists who represented a more 
deliberate stance in preserving the particular Thai understanding of constitutionalism 
opposed the progressive reformers. 
  But a simple juxtaposition of progressive and conservative forces would be 
misleading as the biggest part of the ‘progressive’ forces had not at all any change 
of the fundamental frame of the royalist concept of “Thai-style democracy” in 
mind, but did believe that both concepts, in particular the central role of the 
monarchy and western-like democracy, could be merged harmoniously. These 
hopes were soon disappointed and finally destroyed when the constitution was set 
up and its new institutions lacked the people to use it in the way that had been 
outlined by the drafters. Today many of the formerly progressive liberal activists 
of the 1990s are staunch supporters of a Thai-style democracy and regarding core 
elements of western-style democracy much more critical towards the applicability 
for their country than before. They advocate today that these liberal western 
elements have to be clearly subordinated to the overarching frame of Thai-style 
democracy and constitutionally they are indeed. Others took side of western-style 
democracy, even if it is still hardly possible to suggest a western-style constitutional 
monarchy in public discourse. Their main issue is the harsh use of the lèse 
majesté law. Generally the conceptual front-lines of 1997 were less complicated 
than today when one part of the drafters tried to prevent too much change while 
the other tried to integrate western ideas of good governance with different grades 
of consideration of the given Thai-style framework. At heart the conflict which 
was finally settled by the compromise of 1997 was more about the influence of 
different civilian elites, often using the discussion how far western style elements 
of governance should be integrated in the Thai-style concept as a battle field of 
their power interests. Nevertheless the opposition against western constitutionalism 
was strong. In 1996 for instance, the Interior Ministry representing the bureaucratic 
elite declared the discussions to be a threat to national security since ‘political 
7) See Michael Kelly Connors, “Framing the People’s Constitution”, in: Duncan McCargo 
(ed.), Reforming Thai Politics, Copenhagen 2002, pp.37, 52.
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reform has a tendency to support political participation of the people’.8) In 1997 
short before the economic crisis would eventually change the whole setting the 
discussion heated up to a critical point, triggered by manifest resistance against 
too progressive ideas, such as the reformulation of the section concerning people’s 
sovereignty from “derives from” to “belongs to the people” in Sect. 3 and the 
introduction of a fully elected second chamber in parliament.9) Some conservative 
threatened the scene with the possibility of a para-military intervention which 
reminded of the year 1976 when a student movement had been cracked down in a 
massacre at Thammasat University.10) Interestingly, some media and scholars 
suggested that the critical ideas had been promoted by agents provocateurs to heat 
up the discussion to the point of an abortion of the constitution making process.11) 
Anyway, the Asian economic crisis of 1997 changed the whole frame of the 
process heavily increasing the public pressure to finally enact the constitution 
which was publicly perceived as the only saving mean in shaky times. This, 
finally propelled also the more progressive forces, which enjoyed an emerging 
influence, into a position, which was strong enough not only to be heard but also 
to be involved. Indeed, very quickly now and without too much contestation the 
draft － including the disputed elements － was eventually enacted, probably 
substantially because of the economic crisis had unpredictably speeded up the 
events.12) Even conservative forces saw the constitution now as a chance to 
prevent greater harm and to defend their interests against more fundamental 
change.
  The following course of constitutional development from 1997 until present is 
then marked by five general elections, not less than three constitutions, one coup 
 8) See Sathaban Damrongrachanuphab krasuang mahathai (Damrongrachanuphab Institute, 
Ministry of Interior) Yuthasat krasuang mahathai 2540-2549 (Strategy of the Ministry 
of Interior 1997-2006), 1996, p.40, quoted according to Michael Kelly Connors, 
Democracy and National Identity in Thailand, New York, London 2003, p.169.
 9) See ibid., p.168. 
10) See Prawase Wasi, “An Overview of Political Reform”, in Duncan McCargo (ed.), 
Reforming Thai Politics, p.25.
11) See Connors, in Reforming Thai Politics, pp.37, 54.
12) See Connors, in Reforming Thai Politics, pp.37, 53. 
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d’etat and two governments terminated by rulings of the CC. What was the 
driving force in these dynamics? From 2001 to 2006 the history of traditionally 
instable civilian governments experienced its first exception since 1932 with the 
rule of Thaksin Shinawatra who was eventually ousted by the military putsch of 
2006 and is haunting the establishment behind the putsch since then, with his 
sister as incumbent prime minister of Thailand. While Thaksin managed from 
2001 to 2006 to gain increasingly strong influence as Prime Minister including 
control over some of the constitutional watchdog bodies and attempted partial 
control respectively over the military, he faced a growing opposition led by 
royalist critics within the established elite and middle class, lead by former 
political and business allies who turned to become his sworn enemies. This anti 
－ Thaksin movement came up in 2005. It was led by the particularly royalist 
Democrat Party (DP) in parliament and the extra － parliamentary People’s 
Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a street based protest movement associated with 
the DP. Among the allegations against Thaksin including an authoritarian leadership 
style, the undermining of the constitution’s spirit and corruption, the one which 
was the most sustainable for the following events, was the alleged threat to the 
monarchy.13) In 2006, DP and PAD by boycotting national elections and 
organizing mass demonstrations, both calling for royal intervention, prepared the 
stage for the military coup of 2006. After being endorsed by the King, the junta 
formed an Interim government and enacted the Interim Constitution of 2006 which 
established a Constitutional Tribunal. Its main objective was to dissolve the former 
governing party, Thaksin’s TRT, and its coalition parties and to ban the members 
of their executive boards for five years from politics, while whitewashing the DP.14) 
13) See Marc Askew, “Introduction: Contested Legitimacy in Thailand”, in Marc Askew 
(ed.), Legitimacy Crisis in Thailand, Chiang Mai 2010, pp.1, 2.
14) The Constitutional Tribunal established according to Sect. 35 of the Interim Constitution 
of 2006 was clearly the weakest of the three institutions vested with constitutional 
review powers. While the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court have 
not been touched by the coup maker the CC was abolished, partly to punish an 
institution which had disappointed and partly in order to prevent even the possibility 
of a review of the events and responsibilities leading to the coup. See also Sect. 37 
Interim Constitution of 2006 which specifies the extent of the immunity for the coup.
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In 2007 the Interim government set up a new constitution which was adopted by 
referendum (albeit with a marginal majority in favor). The new constitution, which 
is the present one, re-introduced the institution of a CC with slightly modified 
competences and a different design and composition. Elections in the end of the 
year, in Dec. 2007, brought then a surprising victory of Thaksin’s PPP, founded 
to replace the dissolved TRT. After having been sentenced to jail in absentia 
before because of a conflict of interest involving his wife in a land deal with the 
state, he was represented during the election by Samak Sundaravej, who soon was 
impeached by the CC in 2008 followed by the dissolution of the PPP later in the 
same year. This resulted in the end of the second PPP government under Somchai 
Wongsawat, Thaksin’s brother in law, a mild mannered career judge who had 
served as secretary of state for justice and minister of education before, and a 
military encouraged defection of a splinter-group of the PPP joining the opposition 
now. Together with the DP they formed a new government while the PPP as 
opposition remained the strongest party in parliament. Bloody protest against the 
DP-led “yellow” government resulted in mass protests organized by another street 
based protest movement, the red-shirts, an alliance of Thaksin supporters, 
adversaries of the military coup and the present political system. These protests 
culminated in a government crackdown using massive state force in 2009 and 
2010 and were accompanied by unprecedented open calls for a revolutionary 
change of the system in the face of bloodshed, which were later so not repeated. 
The following national elections in 2011 brought a landslide victory of the second 
party follow － up of the Thaksin － camp, the PTP, which started in 2012 to 
prepare the coming back of Thaksin from exile and a major constitutional reform, 
both recently stopped by a temporarily injunction of the CC. 
  To sum up the front-lines of the divide in between the CC had to perform, 
there are on the one hand the DP and PAD claiming to protect the monarchy, a 
duty they share with the military, and on the other the three parties subsequently 
set up by Thaksin (TRT, PPP and PTP) and the extra-parliamentary protest 
movement, “democratic front against dictatorship” (UDD), here referred to as 
‘redshirts’15). Their objectives are less clear as Thaksin and his senior allies 
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among the career politicians are seeking for reconciliation while parts of the UDD 
seem to favor a regime change whereas the definite agenda is difficult to access 
as every opposition to the governing basic concept of constitutionalism and 
governance would violate the law. While parts of the UDD developed a sense for 
western-style constitutionalism, Thaksin showed a stronger sense for authoritarian-style 
populism legitimizing political power by public support alone. 
  Against this background, the different perception of both’ CCs role becomes 
explainable. From the perspective of those who framed the 2007 Const. and 
designed the present CC, the court under the 1997 Const. had developed 
disappointingly. Initially regarded as an impressively vested institution facing an 
open horizon to claim institutional influence and authority, most observers soon 
saw the court as a second league player. Even if the CC still provided some 
important contributions to political power play, it never overcame its submission 
under Thaksin in 2001 (see below B. II). In the end, the performance was widely 
seen as having paved way for the degeneration of the 1997 Const. Thus, the new 
CC started on a much lower level of premature praise but with much more 
determination as an agent of the dominating state ideology perceived to be 
challenged by Thaksin even more after the coup. Nevertheless, the second CC 
immediately was associated with the “yellow” anti-Thaksin camp and accused to 
apply a double standard in favor of the DP. The complicating moment in the 
present situation is the fact that until now the Thaksin-camp did not formulate any 
agenda without the specific adherence to the monarchy which characterizes 
Thai-style democracy and is precondition to operate in the constitutional system. 
But it is exactly this fear, the fear that elective democracy could be unleashed 
from this specific governance concept, if Thaksin returns home which drives the 
dynamics underlying the present CC in its public perception. This is leading to a 
brief consideration of the mentioned competing concepts of constitutionalism 
forming the matrix for a key part of the CC’s performance.
15) Please note that the color red has nothing to do with socialism.
Thai Constitutional Courts and the Political Order / Glaser, Henning   77


















16) As informal leader, formal victor was Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej.
17) As informal leader, formally Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra is Prime Minister.
18) Dissolved by the Const. Tribunal.
19) As informal leader, formally two Prime Ministers, who were subsequent banned by 
the CC.
20) Dissolved by the CC.
21) DP led coalition government after break away of the PPP-led coalition following the 
ban of the party.
22) As informal leader, formal victor is Thaksin’s sister Prime Minister Yingluck.
78   서울대학교 法學 제53권 제2호 (2012. 6.)
  2. The Constitutional Courts between Competing Concepts of Constitutionalism
  The ongoing tensions in the Thai society and in Thai constitutional life are 
indeed reflections of tectonic movements which can essentially be perceived within 
a paradigm of competing concepts of constitutionalism. Both concepts are strongly 
intertwined, partly conflicting and fixed by the constitution in a clear hierarchical 
relation. Nevertheless, on a discursive level they have been set in motion now, 
corresponding to the shifting social ground of a politically highly divided society. 
One on these two concepts is informed by the model of western-style democracy, 
while it is not representing a “thick” version but consists mainly of the role 
elections play. It shall be addressed therefore as “elective democracy”. This 
governance concept basing the legitimacy of government partly on elections is 
embedded in the frame of another overarching governance concept which is partly 
in contradiction partly operating in a mode of cooperation with western-style 
democracy.
  Leading principle, frame and precondition for the unfolding and exercise of any 
element of constitutionalism in Thailand is insofar the “democratic regime of 
government with the King as Head of State”. This is the technical term of the 
present constitution (as well the 1997 Const.) for the dominance of the so called 
“Thai-style democracy”. The governance concept addressed by it is part of both, 
the written and the so called “unwritten” Thai constitution. The latter is a vague 
and fluid concept containing customary law, prerogative powers according to 
constitutional convention as well as ideological and symbolic narratives with 
normative authority.23) Generally it is referred to as a key element of Thai 
23) See for the royal position according to the unwritten constitution and the corresponding 
legitimacy of the King Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, “The Monarchy and Constitutional 
Change Since 1992”, in Duncan McCargo (ed.), Reforming Thai Politics, pp.57, 63: 
“It follows that the public powers of the King emanate not from a written 
constitution, but from the affection, devotion and trust that the Thai people have for 
him. These sentiments, as implied by the royal stand, form the very foundations of 
the King’s legitimate right to intervene [...] in the affairs of the nation. This right 
overrides all other written legal authorities, be they the constitution or other 
man-made laws.” And: “The King is [...] above all man-made laws in the land, but 
is under the law prescribed by the teachings of the Lord Buddha.” He is therefore 
“definitely not a constitutional monarch of an ordinary kind” but the “highest authority 
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constitutionalism. It is so, not in the sense of a social embeddedness of written 
law, but in the sense of the spirit and necessary essence of any Thai constitution. 
Thus the “democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State” is 
both, the legal basic structure of the written constitution and the vague and fluent 
while omnipresent and omnipotent meta-order, something like the Thai equivalent 
to Western natural law. All written constitutions of the recent decades, including 
the present one, are referring to the “democratic regime of government with the 
King as Head of State”, often using nearly identical norms. The quality of the 
“democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State” as a kind of 
Thai natural law beyond its ‘positivation’ in codified form becomes clear in the 
preamble of the most liberal, the 1997 Const.: 
Phrabat Somdet Phra Paramintharamaha Bhumibol Adulyadej Mahitalathibet 
Ramathibodi Chakkri Narubodin Sayammintharathirat Borommanatthabophit [the 
King of Thailand] is graciously pleased to proclaim that whereas Constitutions 
have been promulgated as the principle of the democratic regime of government 
with the King as Head of the State in Thailand for more than sixty-five years, 
and there had been annulment and amendment to the Constitutions on several 
occasions, it is manifest that the Constitution is changeable depending upon the 
situation in the country.
  These words, similar to the preamble of the present constitution, leave an 
unsuspected impression of relaxation towards the stability of the codified supreme 
law which is contrasted by the gravity and permanence of the “democratic regime 
of government with the King as Head of State”. Written constitutions appear as 
unsteady emanations of political struggle, they come, change and go - not does 
the “democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State”, which 
despite its independence from any codification, is according to Sect. 2 Const. 
2007 expressively adopted ‘by Thailand’ (and not the people)24) and therefore is 
in the land, towering over military, constitution and parliament.”
24) See Section 2 Const. 2007 (and 1997): Thailand adopts a democratic regime of 
government with the King as Head of the State.
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also embodied in central norms of the written constitution. When Sect. 7 Const. 
2007 (and 1997) states that “whenever no provision under this Constitution is 
applicable to any case, it shall be decided in accordance with the constitutional 
practice in the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the 
State”, this was meant as a methodological gearing of the two normative spheres, 
the codified and the cultural.
<Diagram> Written and unwritten constitution in “Thai-style democracy”
  Currently, DP and PAD call on Sect. 7 to stop the mentioned amendment of 
the constitution as it is intended to enable the draft of a new constitution what as 
such is supposed to contravene the “democratic regime of government with the 
King as Head of State” (see C. II). While the exemption of the latter from any 
substantial amendment of the present const. according to Sect. 291 demonstrates 
the central position which it claims at the core of the constitution, it is moreover 
denied to be at the disposal of the constituent power as well.25) The relevance for 
25) See for the opinion in legal theory that the constituent power is an original, unconditioned 
one Ernst Bloch, Vorlesungen zur Philosophie der Renaissance, Frankfurt am Main 
1972, p.136; Martin Heckel, “die Legitimation des Grundgesetzes durch das deutsche 
Volk”, in: Josef Isensee, Paul Kirchhof (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (HStR), Volume VIII, Heidelberg 1995, § 197, marginal 
Thai Constitutional Courts and the Political Order / Glaser, Henning   81
the constituent power leads to the question of sovereignty. Sovereign power is, at 
least acc. the unwritten const. but arguably also reflected by the preamble, shared 
by people and the king in a special form. While the written constitution according 
to Sect. 3 states that it is the King who exercises the sovereignty which, under 
the constitution, belongs to the people, he is also the holder of the “ultimate 
sovereignty”.26) That means, that the sovereign under the constitution is the people 
while the constitution itself is embedded in Thai-style democracy and the 
“democratic regime with the King as Head of State”. The King is therefore the 
one who “commands” constitutions to be promulgated (see the various preambles) 
and moreover, according to the unwritten constitution, the one who gives the 
constitution to the people, while remaining to be the exerciser of27) ultimate 
sovereignty: A coup d’etat, according to this doctrine, if it is executed with a 
‘good intention’ and endorsed by the king according to his customary powers, 
means returning sovereignty back in the hands of the monarch who will give it to 
the people again when the coup-maker proposes a new constitution which is 
accepted by the King.28) Furthermore, according to the royal prerogative enshrined 
note 53; Paul Kirchhof, “Der deutsche Staat im Prozess der europäischen Integration”, 
in: HStR, Volume VII, § 183, marginal note 34; Ulrich K. Preuss, “Constitutional 
powermaking of the new polity: Some Deliberations on the Relation Between Constituent 
Power and the Constitution”, in: Michael Rosenfeld (ed.), Constitutionalism, Identity, 
Difference and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives, Durham 1994, pp.143-144; Michael 
Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject. Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, 
and Community, 2
nd
 ed., London, New York 2010, pp. 130; Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 
9
th
 ed., Berlin 2010, p.91 ff; critical Herrmann Heller, “Staatslehre”, in: Idem, Gesammelte 
Werke, Volume III, 2
nd
 ed., Tübingen 1992, pp.81, 392. On the other hand, according 
to an opinion in ‘doctrine, it is possible to state the revolutionary character of 
constitution making as matter of fact, while accepting that the present constitution 
may criminalize it’. See Josef Isensee, “Verfassungsrecht als politisches Recht”, in: 
HStR, Volume VII, Heidelberg 1992, § 162, marginal note 106.
26) See Michael K. Connors, “Article of Faith, The Failure of Royal Liberalism in Thailand”, 
in: Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2008), pp.143, 145.
27) See Bowornsak Uwanno, Kotmai kap thangleuak khong sangkhom thai, Bangkok 
1994, p.29; referring to him Connors, “Article of Faith”, p.151.
28) See Uwanno, Kotmai kap thangleuak khong sangkhom thai, p.25; There have also 
been coups without royal approval but the last ones of them have been those coups 
which failed.
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in the “democratic regime with the King as Head of State”, numerous powers are 
discussed to be at the royal command beyond any written competence, among 
them the dissolution of parliament or the replacement of the prime minister.29) 
Against this background there is de lege lata no independent concept of representative 
democracy to be found in the constitution.30) Thus, elective democracy is by far 
not the dominating principle in Thai constitutional law, and there can be virtually 
no consistent understanding of it as a community of equal holders of sovereign 
power in the form of a democratic association of the people as the basis and 
standard gauge for all state power. Elective democracy is rather a mechanism to 
allocate, organize and legitimize parts of public power but inevitably embedded in 
the “democratic regime with the King as Head of State”.31) Thus, citizens, 
according to Sect 65 Const. 2007 (see Sect. 47 Const. 1997) for instance, enjoy 
the liberty to “form a political party in order to manifest the political will of the 
people and to carry out political activities in fulfillment of such will through the 
democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State […].”  
  The ranking between both concepts is reflected by two norms dealing with the 
individual who is facing threats of the constitutional order. According to Sect. 69 
“a person shall have the right to peacefully resist an act committed for the 
acquisition of the power to rule the country by a means which is not in accordance 
with the modes provided in this Constitution.” Acc. to Sect. 70 “every person is 
under duty to uphold ‘nation, religion and King’ and the democratic regime of 
government with the King as Head of the State under this Constitution”. ‘Nation, 
29) See ibid., p.29; This was persistently demanded by the PAD against Thaksin in 2006.
30) See for example Sect. 20 (2) German Basic Law: “All state authority is derived from 
the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and 
through specific legislative, executive, and judicial bodies.”
31) It should be noted that this concept which is formulating a substantially different 
governance concept than those which could be called western-style democracy indeed, 
may on the other hand be well served by certain western constitutional theories as 
well. See for example Leopold Stennett Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution, London 
1956, p.20, who described a government of the people, for the people, with, but not 
by the people, what comes close to the position of the people in the Thai-style 
concept.
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religion and King’, the so called “holy trinity” of Thai constitutionalism, is 
another key component of the unwritten Thai-style democracy including the 
identification of King and nation and the special relation of both to Buddhism 
which in Thailand is institutionally and discursively strongly interwoven with the 
monarchy.32)  
  But back to the relative weight of the two concepts: While the protected good 
of Sect. 70 is the “democratic regime with the King as Head of State”, Sect. 69 
provides for the protection against an act committed for the acquisition of the 
power to rule the country by a means which is not in accordance with the modes 
provided in this Constitution. The latter has to be read as the protection of 
elective democracy against coup d’etats. Does the protection of the former evolve 
from the respective duty of every citizen and is not restricted to any mode of 
action, acts of protection the latter are optional and restricted to peaceful means. 
Especially the restriction to peaceful means is decisive in the moment of a coup, 
which will appear regularly combined with the use of martial law or emergency 
powers restricting such peaceful means like demonstrations etc. effectively. If the 
ranking of both concepts is clear,33) it could be asked why there is any tension or 
even competition between them. There are at least two reasons. On the one hand 
the “democratic regime with the King as Head of State” is vague and was never 
explicitly differentiated due to one of its methodological meta rules, the rule not 
to reflect on it in detail if not necessary. On the other hand, the principle of 
elective democracy is similarly vague and it is exactly because of this that more 
far reaching notions of democracy are easily to be connected to the constitutional 
term. The first one who did that consequently was Thaksin calling on his popular 
mandate.
32) For the implicit juxta-position of the concept of ‘nation, religion, king’ on the one 
and ‘constitution’ and [representative] ‘democracy’ on the other hand in the dominating 
mindset shaped by Thai-style democracy as a narrative see Prudhisan Jumbala, 
Nation-Building and Democratization in Thailand: A Political History, Bangkok 1992, p.23.
33) Interesting is also another ranking. So far the constitution places the duty to uphold 
”
the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State“ before the 
duties “to defend the country, to protect benefits of the nation and to obey the law” 
(regulated by Sect. 71).
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<Table 4> Competing concepts of constitutionalism 
Sect. 69 Const. 2007 Sect. 70 Const. 2007






Protected Good elective democracy
“Nation, Religion, King” +
democratic regime with the 
King as Head of State
  The contrast between these two coexisting, competing and cooperating 
components of constitutionalism was therefore less perceived in terms of conflict 
in the frame of 1997 Const. than it was during the 2007 charter drafting. 
Nevertheless, one of the core norms of the “democratic regime with the King as 
Head of State”, Sect. 7, was introduced in the draft charter of the 1997 Const. in 
a way that is instructive because of three related aspects mentioned by Michael K. 
Connors. Firstly, the principle expressed by Sect. 7 was formulated and presented 
to the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) as an amendment of Sect. 6, while 
being taken from previous interim constitutions issued by coup-groups. It was 
introduced very late as an independent Sect. 7 coincidently with a similar lately 
introduced issue, the reformulation of Sect. 3 stressing now that the sovereign 
power belongs to the people. The formulation was opposed by the conservative 
members of the CDA and highly disputed (see above).34) Thus, in a significant 
way Sect. 7 is counter-balancing the first part of Sect. 3 allocating sovereignty to 
the people (who is not exercising it). In direct relation to the demanded 
introduction of Sect. 7, conservatives had been also concerned about the expansive 
rights of the Thai people written into the charter, being afraid that could “moving 
34) See Connors, “Article of Faith”, p.150. Subject of contestation was the doctrine, that 
sovereignty in the last instance belongs to the monarchy, even if constitutionally allocated 
to the people, a contradiction which appears less sharp, if sovereignty in terms of the 
written constitution is understood as being framed by the unwritten one, and even the 
“democratic regime of government with the King as Head of state” as a partially 
codified principle.
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away from traditional concepts of political order, in which the monarchy figured 
greatly.”35) Lastly, Sect. 7 was explicitly meant to guide the CC’s deliberations.36) 
Even if only one expression of the doctrine among many Sect. 7 and its history 
reveal quite clearly the lines of conflict inherent even in the discourse leading to 
the 1997 Const.
  Complemented is the normative complex of the “democratic regime with the 
King as Head of State” in its codified form by its definition as a core element of 
national security due to Sect. 77. 
  The principle is additionally reinforced by its strict protection in criminal law 
making any comment or action in relation to the monarchy which may be 
understood as negative effectively a serious and seriously punished crime (Sect. 
112 criminal code). Surrounding the whole legal complex lays furthermore a core 
narrative according to which the King is not only the supreme institution of the 
constitutional structure but the very embodiment of the nation: the “soul of the 
nation”. This narrative also involves cultural and religious patterns in combination 
with the personal charisma of a leader who rules since more than six decades. 
Indeed, until the unleashed dynamics after the coup, especially since 2009, the 
Thai monarch has been probably more than any other national leader elsewhere, 
with the exception of North-Korea maybe, the unchallenged and beloved center of 
public order and national belonging.37) This explains the sensitivity of those who 
are really devoted to their King and being convinced that the country owes him 
that it has not shared the fate of those countries which had to experience civil 
war or the lost of national identity. 
  It is this complex discursive structure, consisting of different kinds of norms, 
values and narratives, which contrasts and defines the perception of elective 
35) Ibid.
36) See ibid. 
37) See Kobkua, “The Monarchy and Constitutional Change” in: McCargo (ed.), Reforming 
Thai Politics, p.63; Pinit Ratanakul, “Reflections on Development and Tradition in 
Thailand”, in: Pinit Ratanakul, U Kyaw Than (eds.), Development, Modernization, and 
Tradition: Lessons From Thailand, Bangkok 1990, p.261; Stengs, Worshipping the 
Great Modernizer, p.82; Tongyai, “The Role of the Monarchy in Modern Thailand”, 
in: Ratanakul, Than (eds.), Development, Modernization, and Tradition, p.155.
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democracy. Even if clearly embedded in the structure of an overarching principle 
it is the emancipating potential and legitimizing appeal connected to the global 
trend to establish western-style democracy as a kind of universal norm, which 
always caused a momentum of unpredictability concerning elective democracy. 
Indeed, this potential manifested on the basis of a well orchestrated populism 
(including impressive reform achievements) when Thaksin challenged first not the 
King but the rule of law. He did it in principle when he questioned the power of 
the CC to adjudicate on a pending case dealing with the question of his 
impeachment: “It’s strange that a leader who was voted by 11 million people had 
to bow to […] the verdict of the Constitutional Court […].”38) For some this 
statement marked, from a Thai point of view in 2001, a new self-confidence of 
an elected prime minister, for others it was the expression of an extraordinary 
emanation of the “evils” associated with elective democracy 
  Indeed, the concept of elective democracy in Thai political thought is insofar 
embedded in a normatively charged narrative typically associating it with a range 
of weaknesses and evils that is tracing back decades.39) This narrative is reflected 
also by the constitution and arguably informing the role of the CC as ‘discipliner 
of elective democracy’ (see below A. II). The interwoven norms, narratives and 
institutions combining discourse, power structures and social practices constitute a 
kind of Foucauldian dispositif (dispositive).40) Against its background one of the 
major functions and main fields of performance of Thai CCs, the disciplination of 
elective democracy, makes sense. Core of the dispositif is the narrative of “bad” 
elective － and “good” Thai style democracy, while the powers being mobilized 
within the dispositif are aiming to discipline elective democracy. Its discursive 
narratives base on the undeniable practice of vote buying, inducing － according 
38) Thaksin, cited in Pasuk Phongpaichit, Chris Baker, Thaksin, 2
nd
 ed., Bangkok 2009, 
p.2.
39) For the often negative perception of elective democracy being contrasted with Thai  
style democracy see Tongyai, “The Role of the Monarchy in Modern Thailand”, in 
Ratanakul, Than (eds.), Development, Modernization, and Tradition, p.155; Thongchai 
Winichakul, “Toppling Democracy”, in: Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 38 No. 1, 
Feb. 2008, pp.11, 24.
40) See Michel Foucault, Archäologie des Wissens, Frankfurt am Main 1995.
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to this narrative － the elected to recover their respective investments after being 
in office and thus causing corruption in various kinds.41) This, so the narrative, is 
then leading to conditions of self-serving government until the military as the 
guardian of public order finally deems it necessary to clean up by coup d’etat. An 
integral part of this narrative which became immensely important in the Anti － 
Thaksin coalition draws the picture of a-moral politicians who are able to buy the 
votes of the uneducated rural masses to rule the country against the mature 
political culture of the educated middle class.42) On the other side this narrative 
implies also a positive version of governance built on a Buddhist notion of moral 
rule, in easy words enabled via a higher kharma which is reflected lastly also by 
status. This applies according to this view to the elite which is politically represented 
by “senior citizen” and certain “good and capable men” who are beyond the 
doubts raised against elected politicians and culminates in the undisputable moral 
authority of the monarch. His authority and legitimacy is infinitely far above from 
the one which may possibly created by elections.43) Elective democracy according 
to this narrative therefore has to be disciplined and this has to be done strictly. 
Furthermore, while elected politicians from this perspective will principally meet 
the described doubts, there are some rare exceptions. Beside some politicians who 
proved to be beyond the rules of the “dirty game” there is also a relative 
exception among the political parties, namely the democrat party. The DP on the 
one hand is the traditional royalist party founded 1947 to safeguard the role of 
monarchy and therefore closer to a credible performance of the ‘good’ counter －  
narrative than other parties. On the other hand it is claiming to be able to count 
especially on the voters in Thailand’s South who, according to party’s version, are 
said to be ‘true’ and less influence-able by money politics.44) Decisive is that 
41) Tamada Yoshifumi, Myths and Realities. The Democratization of Thai Politics, Kyoto 
and Melbourne 2008, p.251.
42) See Yoshifumi, Myths and Realities, p.251.
43) See for the negative narrative of elective democracy and the elitist counter-narrative 
Chairat Charoensin-o-larn, “Military Coup and Democracy in Thailand”, in: John 
Funston (ed.), Divided over Thaksin, Thailand’s Coup and Problematic Transition, 
Singapore 2009, pp.49, 52; Thongchai Winichakul, “Toppling Democracy”, in: Journal 
of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2008), pp.11, 27.
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social support for this narrative dramatically shifted since Thaksin became the 
emanation of it for the one part and the victim of cynical aristocrats for the other 
part of the country. With the emergence of his firm rule as the first reelected 
prime minister of Thailand he expanded his influence on the basis of his populism 
over the acceptable level when he implicitly challenged one of the core assumptions 
of Thai-style democracy, the “mutuality of king and people” by calling normatively 
on his ‘social contract’ with the electorate.45) Since the formation of a powerful 
alliance of enemies in 2005 the old narrative tracing back decades became the 
heart of anti-Thaksin ideology. It was since then reproduced correspondingly 
divided, shared or rejected according to the front lines of the political divide with 
the redshirts countering it by accusing the established elites, ammat (aristocratic 
bureaucrats), of cynically double standards and hypocrisy. The CC became the 
major enforcer of the mandate to discipline elective democracy along the rationale 
of the narrative and therefore the institution identified as main adversary by those 
who reject the dispositif. 
  3. Institutional Context of Constitutional Review 
  This is leading to a last aspect, the positioning of constitutional review within 
the system of constitutional institutions and the judiciary. It seems generally to be 
the fate of young constitutional courts to face some uncertainty about their real 
role, authority and influence in relation to other constitutional players on the one 
hand and other courts on the other. This is partly due to the fact that they are not 
exclusively political nor legal institutions but both. CCs are courts but special 
ones, often staffed with professionals who are not career judges and sometimes 
not even lawyers, which have to apply constitutional law which is essentially the 
“law of the political” and thus commanded by a different rationale than that 
enshrined in other laws. On the other hand CCs intervene in politics but not 
44) See Mark Askew, Performing Political Identity: the Democrat Party in Southern 
Thailand, Chiang Mai 2008.
45) See Kevin Hewison, “Crafting Thailand’s New Social Contract”, in: The Pacific Review 
17 (2004), pp.503-522.
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according the political rules of decision making but by claiming to enforce the 
supreme law and thus unfolding a judicial idée directrice and not a political one. 
Moreover, young CCs are not only not really belonging to one of the two sides - 
politics and courts - exclusively but often are also starting from “zero” concerning 
their institutional experiences in strategies and tactics of inter-constitutional 
competition when facing their counter-parts which are regularly not happy about 
the emergence of a new player intervening in their business. These considerations 
have some relevance for the two Thai CCs. In general, both CCs did not manage 
to emerge from the shadows of the other courts or emancipate as players 
following their own institutional agenda. The latter applies to the first court in 
relation to the overwhelming influence of the government while the second proves 
to function according to the role it was assigned to by the ideological and 
normative concept of governance dominating the constitution. Both CCs had and 
have to face two strong judicial rivals: the Supreme Court of Justice － rich in 
tradition － and the younger Supreme Administrative Court. The latter was founded 
a little bit later than the Constitutional Court, in 1999, and started quite successfully 
to profile, including some human right cases which, on side of the CC, marked 
only a blank space of protection. The Supreme Administrative Court, like the 
Constitutional Court, is modeled according to French and German influences46) 
but even if being the younger court is able to claim a portion of the inheritance 
of the former royal Council of State which was established by King Rama V. in 
1892 (with himself as President), what invests the institution with a kind of 
symbolic capital ahead of the CC.47) Only some years after foundation the 
Supreme Administrative Court commanded a better reputation than the CC yet, 
which was reflected by enduring difficulties to find judges from the Supreme 
Administrative Court (SAC) who were willing to be sent to the Constitutional 
Court ”on the ticket“ of the SAC.48) The existence of the SAC as a human right 
46) See Akaratorn Chularat, “The Legal State” in Law, Constitution Issue 1, Jun.-Sept. 
2007, p.38. (In 2007, when the article was written, Akaratorn Chularat was the president 
of the Supreme Administrative Court.).
47) See ibid., pp.35, 38.
48) According to Sect. 225 Const. 1997 two of the fourteen judges of the Constitutional 
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court may have supported the CCs in concentrating on their mandate to discipline 
elective democracy more consistently as the rationale of both paradigms, disciplining 
elective democracy and enabling civil rights, may contradict sometimes. Nevertheless, 
the most important court in Thailand is still the Supreme Court (of Justice) which 
traditionally enjoys the special trust and favour of his Majesty the King of 
Thailand and is regarded as a key pillar of good governance.49) Symbolically this 
is shown by the fact that it is the President of the Supreme Court of Justice who 
is placed nearest to his Majesty among the courts’ presidents on occasion of 
official ceremonies and the only representative of the judiciary giving an oath of 
allegiance to the King at the annual birthday ceremony of the King. Therefore the 
newly introduced CC in 1997 was not very welcome by the Supreme Court. 
Strongly disputed was especially the question if the CC should receive the 
competence to decide on court decisions like the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, thus to be able to overrule the Supreme Court. Judges from the CC 
lobbied massively against these attempts which soon were buried. Nevertheless, 
the constitution maker applied the idea of concentrated review consequently in the 
sense that it was the sole right of the CC to interpret the constitution authoritatively. 
If courts below the Supreme Court decided to refer cases to CC on grounds of 
constitutionality of applicable law － on their own initiative or on request of a 
party － the court would stay its trial until the CC would issue its decision, 
which then was binding on the courts. This gave the CC a potential they did not 
use to mark their certain position vis-a-vis Supreme Court by ruling extensively in 
its realm. Latest since a political sensitive case in 2001 authority, dignity and 
informal influence between the formally equally ranked courts is quite differently 
allocated with the Supreme Court ranking at the top and the CC at the end.50)  
Court had to come from the Supreme Administrative Court by election at a general 
meeting among the judges by secret ballot.
49) See Chanchai Likhitjitta, “Supreme Duty”, in Law, Constitution Issue 1, Jun.-Sept. 
2007, p.58 (Chanchai Likhitjitta was the president of the Supreme Court). According 
to Sect. 218 of the present const. the ordinary Courts of Justice enjoy also the 
general competence having the power to try and adjudicate all cases except those 
specified by the Constitution or another law to be within the jurisdiction of one of 
the other Courts.
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II. Organization: Composition and Competences 
  With regard to composition and competences of the CCs the focus lies merely 
50) The extraordinary role the judiciary and especially the Supreme Court of Justice, who 
served after the coup also as president of the Constitutional Tribunal, is reflected in 
the events leading to coup of 2006. See for these events Michael J. Montesano, 
“Political Contests in the Advent of Bangkok’s 19 September Putsch”, in: John 
Funston (ed.), Divided over Thaksin. Thailand’s Coup and Problematic Transition, 
Singapore 2009, pp.1, 2-7. In 2006 a series of incidents accelerated the mobilization 
of mass protests against then Prime Minister Thaksin who in reaction announced the 
dissolution of the parliament in February 2006 and scheduled new elections for April. 
The opposition, in particular the Democrat Party, nearly immediately declared to 
boycott the election while an extra-parliamentary opposition, the PAD, supported by 
the Democrat Party, called in mass rallies for a royal intervention and the appointment 
of a new prime minister by the King due to the rules of the “democratic regime of 
government with the King as Head of State”. After the election, which was producing 
the expected victory of Thaksin’s governing party, necessary by-elections were 
boycotted by the opposition again, accompanied by a petition to the Central Administrative 
Court to cancel the by-elections. This move was intended to prevent the constitution 
of the house and was succeeded by another petition to suspend the results of the 
whole election. On 3 April 2006, then Prime Minister Thaksin declared his victory on 
television and reiterated a former proposal for a government of national unity 
supported by an independent reconciliatory commission including an offer to resign if 
this commission would recommend so. After the plan was rejected by the opposition 
immediately, the Prime Minister returned on 4
th 
of April from an audience with the 
King and announced that he eventually would not accept the office of Prime Minister 
but would act as Caretaker Prime Minister until his successor would have been 
elected by the Parliament. After the opposition did not accepted the move and 
continued the boycott of the by-elections holding instead another mass rally on April 
7, the King, in an extraordinary televised speech to senior judges requested the judiciary 
to take action to resolve the crisis. In this situation it was the Supreme Court of 
Justice which took the leading role to solve the crisis, before finally the military 
stepped in. The then President of the Supreme Court of Justice recalls the words of 
HM the King in a widely recognized speech to newly appointed judges of the court 
of justice on 25
th
 of April: “So I ask you to consider － go back and consult with 
judges of other courts, for example the Administrative Court and Constitutional Court, 
as to what should be done, and then swiftly act accordingly, otherwise the country 
will be affected.” Words of His Majesty King Bhumipol Adulyadej cited in Likhitjitta, 
“Supreme Duty”, p.58. Meanwhile the Court of Justice called three members of the 
Election Commission to resign and, after they refused to do so, jailed the Election 
Commissioners because of a violation of their duties. On 8 May 2006, the Constitutional 
Court finally invalidated the elections and ordered a new round of elections scheduled 
for October, paving the way for the coup to resolve the crisis.
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on the present CC while some comparisons will be drawn also to the first one, 
especially where this is reflects aspects of continuity and change in the development 
of constitutional review. 
  1. Organization and Composition of the CCs 
  As most other countries Thailand adopts a one chamber system.51) This applies 
for both CCs while the number of judges changed from the first to the second 
CC with fifteen judges at the first to nine judges at the present court. The CC 
has and had one president elected from among the CC justices.52) Justices serve a 
non-renewable term of nine years. 
  Interesting are the sociological patterns reflected by the composition of the 
bench and especially the respective shift in the sociological structure of the bench 
with the creation of the second, post-coup court.53) The first CC was, according to 
Sect. 255, 257 Const. 1997, composed of seven career judges, five of them to be 
elected from among the judges of the Supreme Court, two from the Supreme 
Administrative Court, and eight other qualified persons, five of them qualified in 
the field of law, three of them qualified in the field of political science. These 
latter eight judges had to be selected by a committee consisting of the President 
of the Supreme Court, four deans of law and four deans of political science and 
four MPs representing parliamentary political parties, thus giving academics an 
overwhelming majority to select the majority of eight of the fifteen justices. 
Among twenty-six analyzed biographies of justices of the first CC elected and 
selected according to Sect. 255, 257 a wide range of different career types can be 
identified. Despite the fact, that most of the judges have been active in different 
professional fields the following schema of main career paths before their career 
as justice at the CC can be observed: Ten have been senior bureaucrats, nine 
career judges, five have been professors of law or political science, two were 
51) A CC with a two － chamber system is the German.
52) The other important Southeast-Asian CC, the Indonesian Court, is also organized as a 
one-chamber court with nine judges, under them one president and also one 
vice-president, both being elected from among the justices of the CC.
53) Numbers based on own research.
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diplomats, precisely ambassadors. Among the five professors, four have been 
senior professors from one of Thailand’s two leading faculties of law or political 
science respectively. This altogether is reflecting a veritable elite cross-section of 
pre-coup Thailand before the political divide.54) Nevertheless, many of the justices 
have not been representatives of the highest echelons of their career field or 
recruited at the peak of their career nor have they been representing a particular 
competence in constitutional law in their vast majority. In fact, the CC, like others 
of the newly introduced constitutional institutions, seem to have often served 
primarily as an elite reservoir for professionals of a certain status rather than it 
has been staffed according to its primary constitutional function. The general 
sociological patterns of justices are correspondingly similar, indicating a certain 
elite cohesion. All justices have been Buddhists, one a woman. Twenty of the 
justices studied at Thammasat University, two at Chulalongkorn University, two at 
both of these two leading universities, two completely abroad. Eleven judges had 
studied partly abroad, five in the USA, two in England and other two in France, 
one in the Netherlands and one in New Zealand.55) Remarkable is that only two 
among the five professors have been law professors, only one a professor from 
one of the leading faculties, both not experts in constitutional law. Remarkable are 
the ties to the executive power and the military: Four of the justices have been 
advisor to the prime minister, and nine, including four out of the five presidents 
of the court (!), have achieved a Master at the National Defense College. 
Different from the subsequent court under the 2007 Const., the first CC was less 
homogenous in the way in which the political preferences of the judges have been 
perceived by the general public. The CC of 1997 became a somewhat divided 
court especially since 2001 and 2003 respectively and until 2006. Before 2003 
there have been only five from fifteen judges said to be reliably on the side of 
54) See for an understanding of elites Chris Shore, “Introduction. Towards an Anthology 
of Elites”, in: Chris Shore and Stephen Nugent (eds.), Elite Cultures. Anthropological 
Perspectives, London and New York 2002, p.1.
55) This is also interesting as not few of the leading constitutional law professors have 
studied in Germany contributing to the impression of a significant distance between 
CC and academia.
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the Thaksin government, while the other ten were not so predictable, even if not 
all clearly against the Prime Minister. This pattern changed in 2003, when PM 
Thaksin gained control not only of the National Counter Corruption Commission 
(NCCC) and the Election Commission (EC) but also of the CC after four judges 
have retired.56) Among the new justices have been three who were supposed 
former allies of the PM.57) With them complementing the five mentioned above, 
the government gained a majority of eight justices said to be reliably “friendly”.58) 
However it has to be noticed, that at least two of the new “Thaksin-friendly” 
justices commanded a comparatively remarkable educational background as lawyers,
 
but at least one of them turned out to be very eager compared with other justices 
to gain further knowledge specifically as a constitutional lawyer and constitutional 
court judge.59)  
  Against this short glimpse on the sociological pattern of the first CC the 
56) See, Pasuk/Baker, Thaksin, p.174.
57) These persons have been the retired Director General of Customs who was said to 
have supported Thaksin by a positive statement during investigations against one of 
Thaksin’s companies facing charges of tax evasion. Secondly a Police Major-General 
who was prior to his nomination holding a position as an advisor in the Prime 
Minister’s Office and had orchestrated one of the signature campaigns in favor of 
Thaksin when he faced an impeachment by the CC in 2001 in an case concerning 
his asset declarations (see below, B. II). The third justice had been the retired deputy 
secretary-general of the Prime Minister himself and a former business partner.
58) See Pasuk/Baker, Thaksin, p.174.
59) One of these two hold not less than three bachelor grades － one from the Royal 
Police Cadet Academy in Public Administration, one in Economics and one in Law, 
both from Thammasat University － and two master: one in Public Administration 
and one in Political Science, from the prestigious National Institute of Development 
Administration (NIDA) and Chulalongkorn University respectively. He is also author 
of a book about “Thai Administrative Law” (in Thai). The other one, beside his LLB 
in law from Thammasat’s faculty of law, had an M.A. from the National Defense 
College and a LLM. from the University of Washington, and was later Director 
General of the Department of the Treasury, and Deputy Permanent Secretary in the 
Ministry of Finance before he became justice at the CC. The particular interest in 
improving skills in constitutional law of one of the justices is deduced from the 
continuous, active participation of the respective one in informal and semi-official 
meetings with foreign experts in constitutional law which have been organized by a 
foreign political foundation supporting the court.
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composition of the second, post-coup CC (2008-present) is particularly telling. The 
nine Judges of the present CC, who are appointed by the King (as the judges of 
the first CC and the Constitutional Tribunal were), after being elected and selected 
respectively from the following three sources60): Three Supreme Court justices are 
elected from the General Assembly of the Supreme Court, two justices are elected 
from the General Assembly of the Supreme Administrative Court and four judges 
a selected by the “Selection Committee for Constitutional Court Justices”. Two of 
these selected judges have to be qualified in the field of law, two in the field of 
political science, public administration or other social sciences. The selection 
committee comprises five members, namely: 
  1) The President of the Supreme Court
  2) The President of the Supreme Administrative Court
  3) The President of the House of Representatives
  4) The Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives 
  5) One person selected by and amongst the Presidents of independent constitutional 
organs
  On the first view it becomes clear that career judges are those who have the 
strongest say about how the CC looks like. They are not only electing five from 
the nine judges and thus the majority, but have a good chance to dominate also 
the selection of the remaining four. Given the highly divided nature of the Thai 
polity it is likely that the two judges in the selection committee, namely the 
president of the two supreme courts, will be able to align themselves either with 
the President of the House of Representatives or with the opposition leader, 
providing them the majority to select also the rest of the bench. This counts the 
more as the Presidents of the independent constitutional organs are also selected 
under involvement of the judiciary. A look on the actual composition of the bench 
60) See for this and the following the graphs Office of the Constitutional Court, A Basic 
Understanding of the Constitutional Court of the Kingdom of Thailand, Bangkok 
2008, p.24.
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confirms the impression of a strongly career-judge dominated bench. The professional 
background of the nine justices may be summarized as follows: 
  ⦁Senior Supreme Court Judge, former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Justice, 
Secretary-General of the Supreme Court
  ⦁Senior Supreme Court Judge
  ⦁Senior Supreme Court Judge
  ⦁Supreme Court Judge
  ⦁Supreme Court Judge
  ⦁Justice of the Supreme Administrative Court, Justice of the Constitutional 
Court (2006), Justice of the Supreme Court
  ⦁Justice of the Supreme Administrative Court, Supreme Court Justice
  ⦁Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  ⦁Ambassador, Member of the Constitution Drafting Commission 2007
  This composition shows not only an overwhelming influence of career judges 
from the highest career echelons but, all in all, more career judges and especially 
those from the Supreme Court than it might have been expected after a first view 
on the legal composition scheme of the CC’s bench. Not only turns the conceptually 
possible relation of five judges to four other suitable professionals eventually out 
to be an actual 7 : 2 majority of career judges. But in fact, even the two justices 
who are not selected among career judges but among diplomats seem hardly able 
to contest their colleagues’ authority in legal questions. In so far, it would bea 
difference if senior professors (of constitutional law or political science) would try 
to argue against the majority opinion of career judges who are belonging to the 
very top of the judicial elite than it is expectable to be the case if former 
ambassadors, expert for foreign relations, do. Significant is also that even the two 
justices coming from the Supreme Administrative Court are former Supreme Court 
Judges. The sociology of the court, that is very clear, changed remarkably from a 
more amorphous elite-crosscut to an assembly dominated by career judges from 
the Supreme Court. Beside this shift to a domination of the CC by a very 
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particular segment of the country’s administrative elite, there are partly similar 
pattern concerning the justices of the first court: All judges are Bangkok based, 
male and Buddhists, seven of the nine justices studied at the faculty of law 
Thammasat University, two at Chulalongkorn University, among the latter one of 
the former ambassadors who studied international relations, what results in the fact 
that seven out of eight lawyers are from Thammasat’s faculty of law. Only three 
of the judges studied abroad. All seven career judges served at the Supreme 
Court, even those who are elected among the Administrative Court judges. 
Considering these facts from an inter-temporal perspective it is the crucial 
question: what does the significant shift to such a domination of Supreme Court 
Judges imply? The thesis is firstly that the shift is not an expression of an 
attempted professionalization in terms of constitutional law expertise. Two facts 
may indicate this. On the one hand are career judges from the Supreme Court law 
experts but not particularly in constitutional law while on the other hand such 
experts are available and normally highly esteemed and practically required. Given 
the fact that scholarly opinions in general and in constitutional law particular are 
highly respected and that academics generally have a comparatively very strong 
impact on politics as members and regular or ad-hoc advisors respectively of 
nearly all important decision-making bodies and furthermore appearing as a kind 
of national interpreters of all possible policy questions on a daily basis in the 
media, their total absence at the present CC may serve as an indicator for this 
thesis. This raises the question why career judges have been made so dominant if 
not to professionalize the review capacity of the court in terms of constitutional 
law. A first hypothesis to explain the significant increase of the career judge － 
and the Supreme Court － element respectively without an observable concurrent 
professionalization in constitutional law, is, that this phenomenon expresses a 
process of intensified social closure of the governing elite. According to this 
approach, it would be the shift to the most reliable elite segment of the country 
in terms of loyalty towards the basic values of the constitution, which would 
explain the recruitment of the guardians of the constitution from among Supreme 
Court judges. 
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  Indeed do judges receive a particular kind of trust, which makes them to 
represent one of the two senior squads of the official concept of Thai constitutionalism 
together with the military. Even if this thesis cannot be illuminated here 
sufficiently, it is the constitution itself which offers some meaningful indications, 
accentuating in the same time the difference and ranking of the two governance 
concepts mentioned above: As already said, it is the King of Thailand who, 
according to Sect. 3 Const. 200761), exercises the sovereign power of the Thai 
people through the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the Courts. 
But among the three state powers through which he does, it is evidently the 
judiciary which is much closer appropriated to the King than any other one. This 
becomes clear from the oaths the representatives of the three state powers have to 
give when taking office. They are significantly different.62) In a country like 
Thailand where communication in general and political communication in particular 
is very much dependent on the exact understanding of the formulations used, often 
indicating the relevant message only implicitly or allusively,63) such differences 
may tell a lot － especially if they are about the duties of state officials in 
relation to the King. Against this background, the different formulations of oaths 
present a carefully differentiated and graded awarding of trust and status, with 
which the awarded are put in relation to the respective normative horizon from 
which they receive their credentials and towards which they are supposed to serve 
61) Insofar identical with the Const. 1997.
62) See for a similar approach Kobkua, commenting on the relation of the judiciary and 
members of cabinet to the King as reflected by the constitution, when stating that 
“the practice [of the oaths] evidently implies that each minister and judiciary official 
is first of all a loyal subject and official of the King. They perform their duty on 
behalf of His Majesty. Each owes his monarch personal loyalty which implicitly 
overrides loyalty to others.” Kobkua, “The Monarchy and Constitutional Change Since 
1992”, in: McCargo (ed.), Reforming Thai Politics, pp.57, 59. Kobkua stresses the 
priority of the loyalty towards the King before the loyalty to the constitution, while 
here the differences between the required grades and even forms of loyalty are discussed.
63) For the tendency to communicate by allusion as being a different mode of communication 
from the dominantly “Western” one with impact on constitutional core concepts see 
François Jullien, Detour and Access. Strategies of Meaning in China and Greece, 
New York 2000, p.373.
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their duty. Top of the hierarchy are the judges. Before taking office, according to 
Sect. 201 Const. 2007, they make the following solemn declaration before the 
King: 
“I, (name of the declarer) do solemnly declare that I will be loyal to His Majesty 
the King and will faithfully perform my duty in the name of the King without 
any partiality in the interest of justice, of the people and of the public order of 
the Kingdom. I will also uphold and observe the democratic regime of government 
with the King as Head of the State, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 
and the law in every respect.”
  The other extreme point are the parliamentarians, the representatives of the only 
state power which is not seen as rooted in a line of tradition tracing back to the 
royal service from before the revolution of 1932. According to Sect. 123 Const. 
2007 a member of the parliament taking office has to make the following solemn 
declaration at a sitting of the House － and thus, not before the King: 
“I, (name of the declarer), do solemnly declare that I shall perform my duties in 
accordance with the honest dictates of my conscience for the common interests of 
the Thai people. I shall also uphold and observe the Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Thailand in every respect.”
  In the middle between these two extreme points being closer to that one, which 
is marked by the judges, are the ministers. Before taking office, a minister 
according to Sect. 175 must make the following solemn declaration before the 
King: 
“I, (name of the declarer), do solemnly declare that I will be loyal to the King 
and will faithfully perform my duty in the interests of the country and of the 
people. I will also uphold and observe the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Thailand in every respect.”
  Carefully analyzed the different oaths are offering deep insights in the 
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perception of the state powers as being exercised by the King leaving the 
impression of a highly contrasted enrolment according to which judges are closest 
to the King while parliamentarians are virtually dissociated from the him. Keeping 
in mind the thesis, that Thai CC not only served as guardians of the constitution 
but precisely as ‘discipliner of elective democracy’ the shift in the sociology of 
the present CC becomes a relevant and interesting fact. 
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  Coming back to the perception of judges, ministers and parliamentarians in the 
light of their oaths the following pattern are telling: Very significant is firstly that 
judges and ministers make their declaration before the King personally, while 
parliamentarians do before their own House. From a Thai point of view which is 
devoted to the monarchy according to the ideology of the “democratic regime of 
government with the King as Head of State” this may indicate that their 
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legitimacy has normatively no point of reference. This becomes particularly clear 
as only they are not supposed to be loyal to the King in fulfilling their duty in 
office － as far as it is reflected by their oath － but to their own conscience. 
This particularly sheds some light on the perception of parliamentarians from the 
perspective of official constitutionalism, which leaves them in a quite precarious 
position in terms of legitimacy again. To say an official could not be loyal to the 
King would normally mean to incriminate the respective one of an outrageous 
delinquency and an attitude of treason.64) Thus, to give an oath as a representative 
of a state governed by this basic concept without assuring loyalty to the King, an 
attitude which principally is demanded as the first civil duty of all Thai people 
(see Sect. 70 Const. 2007 and above), seems at least overly remarkable. 
  Interesting, even if on a mere allusive level, is also the mission the different 
state representatives are committed to according to their respective oaths. 
Noticeable so far is the fact that judges are committed to three aims, ministers to 
two, and parliamentarians to only one. Moreover, the different missions are also 
substantially interesting. All three state powers are committed to the people, which 
is the holder of the sovereignty which is exercised by the King (sect. 3). 
Parliamentarians have no other end to fulfill their duty than this minimum 
requirement. Comparing the oaths of judges and ministers then, it is further 
remarkable that the judges are additionally not only committed to “justice” like 
ministers are to the “country”, but also to “public order”. This indicates on behalf 
of the judges the existence of two functional commitments of judges which are 
interesting concerning the differentiation of upholding “justice” and “public order” 
in the frame of judicial duties. This differentiation may imply that upholding 
“justice” is not necessarily including “public order”, so that both concepts are not 
identical and that serving both ends alternatively may be possible for judges.  
  Striking are finally the differences pertaining to the normative reference to 
64) How sensitive the feelings towards the loyalty to the monarchy are is exemplified by 
reactions to a recent proposal of a group of academics from Thammasat University to 
mitigate the harsh punishments of the criminal law on lèse majesté which prompted 
warnings from different representatives of the military and even threats with a 
possible coup d’etat if the group would continue. See Bangkok Post 27/09/2011.
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which the duties of the different office holders are linked by the oaths. Especially 
the normative horizon of judges on the one side and ministers and parliamentarians 
on the other side differs significantly. While the first are normatively committed 
to the “democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State”, the 
“constitution” and the “law” are ministers and parliamentarians committed only to 
the constitution. In need for explanation is the fact that the constitution does not 
only includes the “democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the 
State” explicitly at a prominent place but obviously elevates it at the top of the 
normative hierarchy of the constitution visible for instance in Sect. 291 (1) which 
is limiting constitutional amendments accordingly. In other words: it is the 
principle, or better doctrine or ideology, of the “democratic regime of government 
with the King as Head of State” which forms the basic structure of the 
constitution itself (see above). More interesting, this constitutional duty applies 
especially to political parties and parliamentarians as Sect. 65 shows.65) If 
everybody, and political office holders in particular, is obliged to uphold and 
observe the “democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State” 
by the emphatic and supreme order of the constitution, it is in the need of 
explanation why only judges are ordered to refer their oath not only the 
constitution but additionally also to this central part of it. From this point of view 
it is not only the different treatment of judges compared to ministers and 
parliamentarians which has to be explained but also the reason for the 
differentiation of the ideology of the “democratic regime of government with the 
King as Head of State” and the “constitution”, while both’ identity is presupposed 
for parliamentarians and ministers. 
  Two related explanations may be offered. The first is that the formulation of 
the oaths defines and reinforces the political concept of putting the judiciary 
explicitly closer to the King in the very center of the “democratic regime”. 
  A second, related explanation, which was mentioned above, is that the ideology 
of the “democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State” 
appears in its nature as being part and not-part of the codified constitution, a 
65) See above, A I.
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quality which is crucial for the understanding of Thai constitutionalism. In this 
sense judges are supposed to uphold both dimensions and wherever the written 
constitution contradicts to a normative order emanated from the “democratic 
regime of government with the King as Head of State” the written constitution 
may be adjusted accordingly. Such an operation can be expected reliably only 
from judges who serve their King with true devotion and the necessary normative 
understanding. Given the fact, that elective democracy in the version of the 
Thaksin-camp emancipated conceptually from its Thai-style frame and became a 
potential threat for the “democratic regime of government with the King as Head 
of State” which was not stifled but fanned by the coup of 2006, the conditions to 
define the guardians of the latter changed accordingly. A more reliable 
avant-garde was needed now, which is able to handle the constitution in the most 
effective way to strengthen the normative basic structure against the unleashed 
dynamics of elective democracy. This is the background, against which the shift 
in the sociological patterns makes every sense. From this perspective it seems to 
be an appropriate strategy against any capture of the CC by forces not being loyal 
to the “democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State”, given 
the fact that the Thai judiciary is indeed forming a highly self contained, 
ideologically largely homogenous elite.
  The judiciary is indeed representing the one state power which has always been 
associated most strongly with the royal authority while, in the same time, having 
the greatest distance to the concept of elective democracy with all the evils 
typically associated with it in Thai political thought. Hence, the prominent status 
of judges in the predominating perception of the Thai society is based not on a 
rational legal status alone nor on personal power or high income, but on a certain 
authority, which is derived from the representation of the King as the centerpiece 
of the written and the unwritten Thai constitution. This special position elevates 
the judges in the public perception high above normal citizens to the top of a 
society, which is hierarchical at heart but requires a high level of loyalty on the 
other hand, including to those social rules which are contributing to the formation, 
reproduction and corporative self-control of a closed and ideologically determined 
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elite.66) Considering the judiciary as a particular reliable elite the constitution of 
2007 expanded the CC’s position in relation to government and parliament, both 
institutions which have been considered as less reliable on the basis of the 
elective democracy-element within the Thai constitution. Consequently it is now 
more difficult to impeach a justice under the 2007 Constitution than before, what 
turned out to be not only a theoretical question as will be shown below (C.II). As 
in the 1997 Constitution, the Senate (but notably not the House) can remove a 
justice for corruption and malfeasance by a 3/5 vote. However, different from the 
1997 Const., the Senate under the 2007 Const. is involved in the selecting of the 
appointed part of the members of the Senate.
  2. Competences 
  Since 1997 Thailand follows the system of specialized constitutional review, 
with both Thai CCs commanding similar competences, which are comparatively 
wide. Both combine the French style a-priori review of draft legislation with the 
German-style a-posteriori review. Beside review powers, which also contain emergency 
66) The loyalty to the King is binding judges in fact to a set of strict rules of purity 
and cohesion concerning their physical, moral and social appearance. Judges, due 
these partly written, partly unwritten rules are required to appear distant to the rest of 
society and especially devoted to HM the King. Intermarriages of judges are significantly 
often and at least welcome, social contacts inclined to be restricted in general to 
other judges, using the same sport clubs and other social platforms especially reserved 
for judges or having separated areas for them. Not only the family background of 
applicants for the judicial service but also their physical integrity and impeccable 
reputation may reportedly be requested as attributes of a candidate. Under these 
circumstances it is the judicial career which is by far the most attractive one for law 
students, even if some good students may back off achieving it because of the strict 
requirements pertaining in particular to the social life of judges. Even prior traffic 
violations are reported to be a possible reason for disqualification of a successful 
application to be admitted for the judge exam. Not a few families, pining after one 
of their children becoming a judge one day, do not allow their adult children to 
drive to the law school by themselves, to protect their record of being fouled even 
by minor offences against traffic law which is feared to terminate the dream to 
represent HM the King one day as a judge. Compare this with Indonesia, where 
justices of the CC are tolerated with a prior conviction which is less than five (!) 
years.
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legislation, the two other main competences are those to decide organ disputes and 
－ probably opening the most significant and typical field of activity of Thai CCs 
－ those dealing with different aspects of elective democracy. 
a) Review Powers
  Review powers encompass the review of constitutionality of law, prior and after 
promulgation including emergency decrees and organic bills (Sect. 154, 155, 141, 
149, 211, 245, 257, 212, 184 Const. 2007). The fact that different kinds of laws 
and different suitable applicants are subject of regulation throughout the constitution 
makes it difficult to comprehend the constitutional system on one view. Noteworthy 
is that affected individuals have the right to request legal review according to 
Sect. 212 Const. 2007 directly, what was not possible under the 1997 Const. 
Under the const. of 1997 individuals could seek protection only via the Ombudsman 
or upon request by courts, possible on initiative of the defendant or the court 
itself. As it turned out that many judges seemed to reject petitions of defendants 
according to subjective reasons, the introduction of an individual right to petition 
the CC promised to be a significant change.67) In fact the protection of individual 
rights did not change much under the Const. 2007. Moreover it might be too 
simplifying to interpret the extension of eligible applicants for legal review simply 
as an attempt to strengthen individual liberties. There is another possible rationale 
for the introduction of the entitlement of individuals to address the CC to be 
taken into consideration. When the 1997 Const. was designed it created several 
watchdog bodies like the CC, the Election Commission or the Counter Corruption 
Commission to control the destructive potential of elective democracy. As many of 
them have been packed since 2003 with government-loyal men, the coup-makers 
learned that these institutions have not been capable to prevent the perils of 
unleashed elective democracy on the basis of populism. On the other hand, prior 
to the coup of 2006, it was the PAD as a mass movement of concerned citizens 
67) See James Klein, The Battle for Rule of Law in Thailand: The Constitutional Court 
of Thailand, Paper presented at the KPI Congress IV - Five Years of Political 
Reform Under the New Constitution, 8-10 November 2002.
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which became very important for the campaign to oust then PM Thaksin. Thus, it 
became one of the rationales of the new constitution to empower comitted 
individuals to serve as control agents of the political power based on elective 
democracy and to protect the “democratic regime of government with the King as 
Head of State”. Very recently, in a landmark case which will be discussed below 
(under C. II), the CC extended its review powers in favor of individuals in a 
significant step. Until this case, the CC has been regarded to be entitled by Sect. 
68 Const. 2007 to intervene in attempts to overthrow the “democratic regime of 
government with the King as Head of State” on request of the Attorney-General 
who, for his part, could act ex officio and on request of an individual. Now, the 
CC, in a case in which the Attorney-General did not act, accepted a request of an 
individual directly filed to the CC.  
  This enabled the CC to stop ongoing readings of a draft amendment bill which 
should have enabled the set up of a constitution drafting assembly.68) This sets 
another signal for the trend to enable individuals to police alternative political 
movements for the sake of the constitutional system. This interpretation of the 
trend under the 2007 Const. to widen citizens’ access to the CC is reflected by 
the court’s restrictive handling of human rights cases (see below under B. II). 
  Furthermore, review powers of the CC are generally restricted to acts of 
legislation. There is no review of court decisions or administrative acts by the 
CC69) but the latter are to be reviewed by the independent administrative courts. 
68) It was said that under both constitutions the CC had no explicit competence to 
review constitutional amendments, as such is not explicitly stated. See for example 
Harding, Leyland, The Constitutional System of Thailand, p.165. At least according to 
the CC’s practice this is not true anymore. For this and general arguments against 
such a limitation of review powers in both Thai constitutions see below.
69) Under the Const. 1997 it was not completely clear if the CC was entitled to rule on 
administrative decisions. The uncertainty is palpable in some decisions and individual 
rulings of the justices but mostly implicitly while the general problem is not directly 
addressed. The uncertainty is partly explainable as the administrative courts have been 
introduced in 1999 while the CC started its activity in 1998.
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b) Competences in Organ Disputes
  The second classical competence of both CCs was and is to rule on disputes 
pertaining to the powers and duties of two or more constitutional organs, with 
respect to the National Assembly, Council of Ministers or further non-judicial 
constitutional organs (Sect. 214 Const. 2007, Sect. 266 Const. 1997). Non-judicial 
organs are the so called “independent constitutional organs” like the Election 
Commission, Ombudsmen, National Counter Corruption Commission, State Audit 
Commission and the so called “other constitutional organs” namely the General 
Attorney, National Human Rights Commission and National Economic and Social 
Council. Noteworthy is that organ disputes different to the 1997 Const. are 
meanwhile explicitly reserved for contentious case-constellations only. Under the 
1997 Const. the competence due to the vague wording of Sect. 266 was also used 
to define constitutional powers of eligible applicants in one-party constellations in 
which constitutional institutions asked the CC to clarify their status or competences 
(see below, B. I). A special expression of this competence is the competence to 
rule on the question, if international treaties have to be approved by the National 
Assembly (Sect. 190). 
c) Competences as Watchdog Body of Elective Democracy
  While many CCs have strong competences related to elections, elected officials 
and party dissolutions, these competences are significantly more extended and 
widely entrenched in Thai constitutional law than usual. Insofar, the present CC 
has the competence to rule whether members of the legislature have personal 
interests in the allocation of the expenditure budget of the parliament (Sect. 168), 
and, to rule on the personal qualification of members of the National Assembly, 
ministers and election commissioners to be or to stay in office (Sect. 91, 182, 
233). Furthermore, on the question of a member of the House of Representatives, 
if a resolution of his or her party is consistent with the status or performance of 
his or her function or the fundamental principles of the “democratic regime with 
the King as the Head of State” (Sect. 65), or if party executives should cease to 
act contrary to party policies or if they should retire from office. Further the CC 
108   서울대학교 法學 제53권 제2호 (2012. 6.)
rules on the powers and duties as stipulated by the Organic Act on Political 
Parties including a wide range of different kinds of competences. The CC besides 
deciding whether the status as a party has terminated may rule for instance on the 
dissolution of political parties, on the revocation of election rights of party leaders 
and executives. Included are furthermore rulings on the way how members of 
political parties exercise their political rights and liberties or rulings on the denial 
of the registration of parties or formal orders of the Political Party Registrar 
which denies the registration of changes. 
  Taken together the CC in cooperation with the Election Commission and the 
National Counter Corruption Commission appears as the nearly almighty censor of 
clean politics with the power to dissolve political parties and to ban all executives 
from politics if only one executive commits a violation of certain laws, a 
mechanism which will be explained below (B. II). Thus, with these powers the 
CC is able to end any government and eliminate any effective political 
mobilization if single violations of the respective laws can be proven, a task 
which seems not to be too difficult in a system with a long tradition in vote 
buying and money politics throughout the whole spectrum of political parties.
d) Legal Reform Recommendation
  Like the Supreme Court or one of the independent constitutional organizations 
the CC has the right to propose bills (Sect. 139 Para 3, Sect. 142 Para 3 Const. 
2007), while the first CC even had the right to recommend amendments to the 
constitution. 
C. Performance 
  Given the fact that a static snap-shot of constitutional institutions is not telling 
too much about the real impact the have on the political order and vice versa, it 
is the performance of CCs which is a promising subject of study in the given 
context. Performance in constitutional review is enabled and shaped by the outer 
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mechanisms CCs are embedded in and, interrelated to the former, by their own 
potential to produce decisions as well as the institutionally and individually 
moving forces in doing so. Thus, the performance of a CC as being reflected first 
of all by the case record and the substance of its decisions is also the result of 
cooperation with other institutions. Decisive is for instance the mode of mutual 
exchange with the political system and academic doctrine providing constant 
impulses for the adjustment of decision making. The performative potential of CCs 
is further influenced by the concept of law applied and the method and practice 
of decision making. This aspect exemplifies how outer mechanisms and inner 
alignment of CCs are linked as the methodological potential and approach of the 
respective court will be dependent on the impact of academic doctrine on its 
work. 
  This is not the place for an encompassing analysis of the Thai CCs 
performance but only an attempt to identify some typical pattern, after a general 
introduction. Focal point is the underlying function of CCs in reproducing the 
political order and the elements of continuity and change within the case record 
from 1998 to present.
I. Concept of Law, Method and Decision Making
  Having first a look on the formalities pertaining to decision making the Const. 
2007 gives already some basic information. Decisions of the present court can be 
rendered according to Sect. 216 by a quorum of five judges to be done by a 
majority vote. Sect. 216 prescribes also some central points of the procedure: 
Every voting judge shall give a decision on his own part and make an oral 
statement to the meeting before the respective resolution is passed. The decisions 
of the CC and those of the individual judges are to be published in the 
Government Gazette. Decisions must at least comprise the background of the case, 
a summary of facts obtained from hearings, and the reasons for the decision on 
questions of fact and law, as well the provisions of the constitution and other 
laws applied. But, how is the law applied, what is the concept of law and what is 
the legal method guiding its application? The concept of law and the methodological 
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approach of the CCs can best be described as formalistic with a French-style 
notion to spare with detailed argumentation.70) Beside a certain methodological 
reluctance, at least the first CC proofed to keep an eye on political consequences 
of its decisions even in routine cases.71) Along these dialectics, orientated at 
practically appropriate results, not due extended dogmatic considerations, the CCs 
seem to have deployed many of their decisions as being reflected by the grounds 
and the court’s handling of similar cases. Generally, the courts merely stated 
rather than they argued in their presentation of decisions, hardly interpreting 
constitutional norms and statutes historically, systematically, or teleological. Until a 
very recent decision, which used the term ‘rule of law’ in English, even if the 
term was put in brackets72), there has been also no visible sign of any consideration 
of general constitutional theory, comparative constitutional law or international 
law.73) Any recognition of domestic scholarly opinion on the interpretation of norms 
remains basically unapparent. This methodological reluctance in the interpretation 
of norms or at least its formal manifestation in the grounds of the decisions 
corresponds with a lack of principle-based argumentation. Contrary to the Indonesian 
court for instance, which frequently reflects extensively on fundamental constitutional 
principles, such as the rule of law, democracy, the adherence to human rights or 
sub-principles like legal certainty or fairness as emanations of the rule of law74), 
70) See Andrew Harding, “The Constitutional Court of Thailand, 1998-2006”, in: Andrew 
Harding, Penelope (Pip) Nicholson (eds.), New Courts in Asia, London 2010, pp.121, 
129: “In the case of the Thai Court, […], formalistic, French-style judgments were 
given which avoided elaboration as to the reasoning process, creating the impression 
that the decisions were arbitrary and unrelated to each other.”
71) See as an example a case where the first CC openly obtained the opinion of experts 
from the Ministry of Interior, the Foreign Ministry and the National Security Council 
related to a question of equal treatment of Thai woman who are married with a 
foreign husband with Thai men who are married with a foreign wife. While foreign 
wives could become Thai citizen by a simplified procedure, this was denied for 
foreign men. See for the background The Nation 10/10/2003 for the decision CC No. 
37/2546.
72) See CC No. 12/2555, 28
th
 March 2012.
73) Very rarely the CC just stated that its ruling has not been in contradiction with 
international law when the subject matter inclined to do that.
74) See Thai Constitutional Court, Ruling No. 1/2542, with an exception as the CC - 
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Thai CCs did hardly deduce and apply such principles in interpreting the 
constitution or simple law in an elaborated way.75) 
  An observer who noted that the specific style of the Thai CC created the 
“impression that the decisions were arbitrary and unrelated to each other” 
mitigated this finding with reference to some countering pattern of performance, 
namely the fact that all judges have been (and are) obliged to render (own) 
judgments, that dissents became a regular feature of the court’s performance and 
that the Court “made some references to its own previous decisions”. While 
dissenting opinions often contained approaches which seemed methodologically 
more reflected indeed, they generally followed the mentioned pattern. Over-optimistic 
appears especially the evaluation that the Court “made some references to its own 
previous decisions in an attempt to provide a consistent and rational jurisprudence” 
and “also consistently consolidated the sometimes large numbers of cases raising 
similar issues”.76) While the CCs are often facing criticism because of an 
inconsistent handling of similar cases in sensitive issues, there are also examples 
for routine cases decided inconsistently to a significant extent as will be shown 
below. On the other hand, the CC judged a certain kind of similar cases indeed 
similar. But on a closer look it becomes clear that this does not imply the 
development of a specifically consistent application of law or interpretive doctrine 
in these cases but a mere schematic reference to decisions with nearly identical 
facts on a technical basis. In fact, the cases referred to is the “large number of 
cases involving changes in bank interest, brought in 1998-9”.77) These cases have 
been dealing with nearly identical facts and legal concerns, what enabled the CC 
for instance to bind 24 different applications for decision together on grounds of 
without further elaboration - had to decide on the question if the mandate of 
representatives should end with their removal from the party. In the decision which 
had effect on the formation on the government of Chuan Leekpai in a Democrat 
Party led coalition, the court argued with the principle of democracy, but, remarkably, 
as an element of the “democratic regime with the King as the Head of State”.
75) The mentioned recent decision represents a slight change insofar, as it is based on 
the presumption of innocence as an emanation of the rule of law.
76) Harding, “The Constitutional Court of Thailand”, p.129.
77) Ibid., p.129, fn. 73.
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identity one time. Generally, they all have been summarily dismissed because the 
defendants were seeking remedy against a Notification of the Bank of Thailand, 
which was not a proper subject matter for legal review before the CC.78) 
Deducing an attempt to “provide a consistent and rational jurisprudence” by 
references to previous decisions and the effect of an “consistently consolidated” 
dealing with constitutional problems related to this group of cases, seems to miss 
the point. Contrary, the CC especially in these decisions acted completely formally, 
without even any need for substantial argumentation. Aside this group of cases the 
CC was never accused to act consistently by reference to former decisions. 
  An instructive example for a significant lack of consistency in similar cases 
pertains to the application of one of the key competences of the CC under the 
1997 constitution, the competence according to Sect. 266 Const. 1997. The norm 
is dealing with the “case where a problem arises as to the powers and duties of 
organs under the Constitution” and states that “such organs or the President of the 
National Assembly shall submit the matter together with an opinion to the 
Constitutional Court for decision.” The formulation of Sect. 266 was remarkably 
wide in terms of the suitable subject matter. Insofar, the constitution used in the 
Thai original the word pan-ha to describe the subject of the procedure, which 
may be translated with ‘problem’ as in the translation quoted above. This wording 
created a quite far-reaching competence of the CC to decide on any problem of 
constitutional bodies about their rights and duties. Thus, literally understood, Sect. 
266 dealt not only with the competence to decide about so called 
”
organ 
disputes“, namely contentious case constellations with at least two adversary 
parties involved, but established a jurisdiction to give an authoritative interpretation 
of rights and duties of any 
”
organ under the constitution“. Consequently the 
wording of Sect. 266 created a competence to interpret laws to be applied by 
such an organ. This threatened to overlap with another key competence of the 
78) See for instance Constitutional Court Ruling No. 4/2542; 5/2542; 9/2542; 10/2542; 
12-35/2542; 38-40/2542; 41/2542; 42/2542, all summarized in Office of the Constitutional 
Court, The Constitutional Court of the Kingdom of Thailand, The Constitutional Court 
Rulings, 1998-2000, Bangkok 2003.
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CC, the competence to legal review regulated by Sect. 262. Such an overlap was 
problematic as legal review was only applicable to members of the legislative or 
the Prime Minister, thus a much narrower circle of eligible applicants than Sect. 
266 was open to. Therefore, the procedure due to Sect. 262 as the lex specialis 
for the authoritative constitutional interpretation of laws, was at least partly in 
danger to be levered out by the wide wording of Sect. 266. In sum, the wording 
of Sect. 266 created two problems, one due to the systematic contradiction with 
another constitutional norm and another one due to the creation of an immense 
wide competence of authoritative interpretation open for an incalculable amount of 
cases, bringing the court as the final interpreter of the constitution in the position 
of a kind of super-advisory board accessible for “everybody”. This seemed critical 
from the point of legal policy and the functional design of the court as well. So 
far, the mistake had been on the side of the constitution maker. But what did the 
CC do, how did it handle these competencies? A way out would have been to 
limit the scope of application of Sect. 266 in systematical and teleological 
interpretation if this would not mean to assume a too creative stance in adapting 
the constitution. In a way this happened indeed, but without any methodological 
consideration. In an early decision from 2000 the court has argued that the 
competence according to Sect. 266 would have to be limited to contentious 
procedural constellations and thus denied it’s competence according to Sect. 266 
in a non-contentious constellation because “the issues were only to request the CC 
to explain the meaning of the provisions of the constitution without the fact that 
any legal dispute arose. Therefore, it was not a case where a dispute arose as to 
the powers and duties of organs under the Constitution which the CC could 
decide under Sect. 266.”79)  
  As convincing the result of this restrictive interpretation was, as surprising is 
the fact that the court did not take the opposing wording of the constitution into 
any account but － without further explanation or comment － simply replaced the 
term pan-ha, ‘problem’, used by the constitution, with the term kad-yaeng, 
‘dispute’. Doing so, the court produced a prudent result in a methodologically 
79) Thai Constitutional Court, Ruling No. 6/2542, pp.73, 74. (Italics by the author).
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questionable way as it did not only introduce a new term eliminating the one 
used by the constitution but also introduced a fundamentally different meaning of 
the respective section without commenting on this procedure, its rationale and 
justification with any argument. More surprising, neither did the legislator protested 
nor did the Court keep on using its restrictive interpretation in future decisions.80) 
This, the subsequent handling of the interpretation of Sect. 266, is the most 
striking subject of study. Whenever the CC had to apply Sect. 266 in 
non-contentious case constellations afterwards it completely ignored it. Neither the 
flawed legal design of the constitutional system of the CC’s competencies nor the 
possibility of a more restrictive interpretation of Sect. 266 or the decision doing 
so have been addressed by subsequent decisions. This lack of reflection in any 
relevant direction is accompanied by another curious characteristic. The CC did 
not just depart from the restrictive interpretation but used afterwards two different 
ways to apply Sect. 266. In contentious case - constellations with adversary 
parties the CC tended to use the definitional element ‘dispute’, while in 
non-contradictory constellations, cases in which only one party has been involved 
seeking authoritative advice about its competences, the CC basically stick to the 
original wording of the constitution using the term ‘problem’.81) Nevertheless, the 
CC never gave any reason why it used two different terms referring to the same 
norm of which only one did correspond with the text of the constitution. This 
fact, the co-existence of two parallel interpretations without any visible reflection, 
leaves the inevitable impression of a certain lack of differentiated consideration 
and continuously developed and applied doctrine. This becomes almost palpable in 
an English publication of the Office of the Constitutional Court. Despite the fact, 
that there has been only one decision in which the CC applied the term ‘dispute’ 
in the context of non-contradictory case-constellations and arguing contra legem in 
80) An exception － but less expressive and again without any explanation － is maybe 
CC Ruling 15/2545, dated 25
th
 April 2002.
81) In fact, in the decisions dealing with Sect. 266, there are rarely also other Thai 
words in use which more or less seem to fit the scheme of “dispute” for 
contradictory and “problem” for non-contradictory constellations or composites of both 
Thai words. 
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doing so, the official publication uses not only the term ‘dispute’, but states this 
as the only right and possible interpretation of Sect. 266. Similar to the decisions 
which notoriously blended out the existence of the respective contrary interpretation 
in their own record, the author of the booklet neither mentions the contrary 
wording of the constitution nor the diverging dominating practice of the court 
itself. According to the booklet the constitution says: “In the case were a dispute 
arises as to the powers and duties of organs under the Constitution, [...].”82) That 
this is not just a translation mistake becomes clear in the following explanation 
which emphatically introduces this interpretation: 
It is important that a dispute on the powers and duties of organizations under the 
Constitution shall be a ‘dispute’ in regard to a performance of such powers and 
duties. As a result, the Constitutional Court shall not consider a petition without a 
common ground of dispute. For instance, an interpretation of the powers and 
duties of organizations or a discussion rgarding the powers and duties of organizations 
under the Constitution where a dispute has not occurred, shall not be taken under 
the Constitutional Court’s consideration and decision.83)
  After the present constitution of 2007 eventually changed the text from ‘problem’ 
to ‘dispute’ there is no problem with the interpretation of this competence 
anymore. Nevertheless, as a part of the development of constitutional procedure 
law and the methodological capacity of the court, the interpretation of Sect. 266 
remains a striking lesson.
  If this example is instructive concerning the ability of the CC to formulate, 
develop and apply an own doctrine of interpretation throughout its cases the 
question arises how far constitutional review receives input from the academic 
doctrine in constitutional law.
  Despite the principally long reaching roots of legal review in Thailand not only 
the practice of constitutional review by a specialized court has been started not 
82) Office of the Constitutional Court, A Basic Understanding on the Constitutional Court 
of Thailand, Bangkok 2002, p.41. 
83) Ibid.
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before 1997, but also the academic doctrine of constitutional law in Thailand 
proves to be a similar young even slightly older academic discipline, represented 
by only a comparatively small, although growing, number of experts until today. 
Moreover, quite from the beginning and relevant until present, Thai CCs never 
established a firm and dynamic gearing of their activity with the academic public 
law doctrine as it is typical for other constitutional courts. In some countries like 
Italy, Austria or Germany newly founded courts could base their performance on 
such already existing ties between judicial practice and academic doctrine in 
public law. Differently, Thai CC and constitutional law doctrine rather co-exist in 
separated spheres more than they interact. However, the impact of a cross-fertilizing 
relationship seems to be a crucial factor for performance and capacity of CCs in 
general. Thus, the present composition of the bench by career judges and 
diplomats corresponds with the long-term two-sided distance between the CCs and 
scholarly doctrine of constitutional law. It is less an active part and driving force 
of constitutionalization.84) 
84) On the side of the academia the relatively low discoursive exchange may also be 
explained by the widespread feeling of inconvenience to talk about constitutional 
issues in depth as at least elements of the basic structure of the constitution are 
exempted from the discussion by formal and informal rules, in particular the 
monarchy. The monarchy has to be left out of any legal or political consideration 
due to the wide spread feeling of “revered worship” (Sect. 7 Const. 1997, 2007) and 
the strict law on lèse majesté. But reluctance is also used in relation to the 
performance of courts. Even if not constantly observed, the risk of committing a 
contempt of court however is at least a possibility if comments are too critical. After  
an administrative court for instance had issued an injunction suspending the operating 
permissions of some dozens investment projects in the Ma Ta Phut industrial zone 
which immediately became the most debated legal issue in the country the president 
of the Lawyers Council of Thailand asked “the state agencies and the private sector 
to refrain from talking publicly about the economic consequences of the injunction as 
this could be interpreted as being contempt of court”. Cited in Bangkok Pundit 
14/10/2009. In the early days of the first CC, in 1999, one of the Justices even 
demanded a general ban of public comments of CC decisions. See Klein, The Battle 
for the Rule of Law in Thailand, p.33.
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II. Influence on Law and Politics
  Maybe the most relevant piece of performance related directly to the political 
order, shaping it and being shaped by it over the years, are the decisions of the 
CCs pertaining to elective democracy and the disciplining of democratic participation. 
They are sharply contrasted by the nearly absence of a strong protection of human 
rights provided by the CCs on an ongoing basis. Before these two fields of 
activity are analyzed the activity of the CCs in their similarities and differences 
shall be regarded briefly.
  1. Activity of the Courts in General
  The performance of the Thai CCs in general is ambiguous and not easily to be 
described by catchy phrases like ‘activism’ or ‘passivism’. Compared for instance 
with the younger Indonesian CC, which nearly immediately turned out to become 
an influential, independent and self-confident institution after its implementation, 
the first Thai CC never overcame a certain reluctance in political sensitive cases. 
  On the other hand, if the cases have not been too sensitive, the court handled 
its competence normally on a merely positivist routine base in a reliable manner. 
Dealing with these ‘normal’ cases the CC operated along its constitutional mandate, 
particularly productive in producing a continuous correction of the development of 
elective democracy. These cases are affecting democratic participation not so much 
in the sense of citizen’s direct participation than that of their representatives: 
elected political office holders and political parties. In this type of routine 
decisions dealing with the removal from political offices and the dissolution of 
political parties, the CC functioned in cooperation with the respective constitutional 
agencies, the Election Commission and the Counter-Corruption Commission, rather 
as an judicial automate than an positive legislator or an active instance of legal 
interpretation. Furthermore, the first CC acted reluctantly in human rights cases in 
which it hardly spoke in favor of the individual.85) In very rare cases it did, the 
cases were not dealing with political relevant human rights like the freedom of 
85) Deciding decisively passive in human right cases, the court has been staying insofar 
away from the judicial dynamic the Korean or Indonesian court developed.
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expression or assembly for instance. These general patterns did not change after 
the coup d’etat with the new CC under the Const. 2007 taking over, with one 
important difference: The first court deviated from its constitutional mandate and 
the rule of law in few cases pertaining to politically sensitive constellations while 
the present court arguably may have deviated from the rule of law in the eyes of 
its critics but not from its constitutional mandate. 
  The first CC was accused to be too obedient towards the strong Thaksin 
administration and to use a double standard in impeachment cases in favor of 
him. The second court was criticized to do the same in favor of the royalist DP 
and against the Thaksin-camp, which was considerably weakened after the coup. 
According the critics the court proved to be an active part of the ‘patriotic front’ 
of the formal and informal forces which cooperated to save the “democratic 
regime with the King as the Head of the state” against a return of the ousted 
ex-PM and meanwhile “enemy of the system”, Thaksin. As this front resembled 
most of the sources and representations of power including an active military as 
senior ‘partner-guardian’ of the constitutional order, which itself was designed by 
these forces, it could be argued, that even decisions against the politically weak 
governments of the Thaksin-camp appeared as affirmative to political power. To 
speak about a similar impact of both courts in ruling in favor of the dominating 
power in certain sensitive cases seems therefore considerable. 
  In some respect the situation in 2009 and since 2011 when the Thaksin-camp 
took over again after the coup reminds on the situation in Germany after WWI 
when the new republican government faced the opposition of the joint forces of 
the military, bureaucracy and judges, rejecting the new republican state and its 
government wholeheartedly. However, the difference between Germany in the 
1920s and Thailand since 2007 is the same as between the periods of performance 
of  the first and second CC pertaining to their adherence to political power on the 
one hand and the constitution on the other. While the first CC was accused to 
have violated its constitutional mandate by violating the rule of law, the second 
CC could claim to act in an area of conflict created by the constitution itself. In 
this respect, the CC would act in favor of one constitutional concept against the 
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other. Forced to decide in a case of conflict, the decision for the court could only 
be one in favor of the “democratic regime with the King as the Head of the 
State” as it was nearly uncontested before 2006. 
  Nevertheless, both CCs arguably violated or sacrificed respectively the rule of 
law. Apart from the different context in deciding political decisive cases, the 
second CC remained principally true to the established tradition of constitutional 
review with a little modification. As the CC currently rules in cases concerning 
mega-politics with the established system but against formal political power in 
government and parliament the courts horizon of expectations started to shimmer 
when member of the governing party threatened to abolish the court with the 
already induced major constitutional reform leading to the making of a new 
charter. The probably most promising strategy from the point of view of the CC 
to counter this is a double one. On the one hand, the CC attacked the government 
substantially by stopping the amendment process (see C. II). On the other hand, 
the court proved to be significantly more concerned with human right protection 
than before. If the thesis is true, that the CC on the scout for allies and support 
already started to discover an intensified interest in human right issues and the 
present equilibrium will linger on, this might result in a generally increased 
pro-human right activity of the CC in 2012. 
  So far, the overall activity of Thai CCs over the past nearly fifteen years can 
be outlined briefly as follows: Significant in terms of judicial activity have been 
three aspects in particular decisions pertaining to: mega-politics, secondly routine 
or less divisive decisions pertaining to elective democracy and, finally, human 
right cases. As the former two groups of cases are pertaining to elective democracy 
or democratic participation respectively, it is justified to distinguish only two fields 
of constitutional law, in which the role and impact of the CCs may be analyzed. 
  2. Selected Decisions: Human Rights and Democratic Participation
  Thus, the impact of Thai CCs on the political order will be measured with 
respect of two different fields of influence: human rights and democratic 
participation.86) 
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a) Cases Contributing to Democratic Participation
  Cases regulating the channels of democratic participation are mostly dealing 
with two legal consequences, the removal of elected office holders and the 
dissolution of political parties. The latter also entails the ban of wrongdoers as 
well as members of the executive boards of the respective parties from politics 
according to the post-coup legislation (Organic Act on Political Parties 2007). 
These cases are arguably contributing to a Foucauldian dispositif enshrined in Thai 
constitutionalism that is effectively demanding, justifying and contributing to 
numerous processes aimed to discipline elective democracy. Institutionally it is 
supported by the respective laws and practices, which allow the dissolution of 
political parties, the ban of members of their executive committees for five years 
from politics, or the removal of elected officials by the watchdog bodies in 
charge. The latter are the National Counter Corruption Commission and Election 
Commission, the CC and, since the coup, also the Supreme Court.87) The dispositif 
partly responds to notorious excesses of party politics marked by money politics 
86) Beside these two main types of cases, there have been a number of cases in the first 
years after the Asian financial crisis, 1998-2002, dealing with the constitutionality of 
the legal strategies of government and central bank to counter the consequences of 
the crisis. These cases have been often initiated as attempts of affected people and 
institutions to gain time against the regulations by using remedies to the CC. As 
stated above, they have been handled regularly by summarily rejecting their 
applicability. Other cases dealt with different problems, among them some important, 
especially pertaining to organ disputes but they did not reach the level of landmark 
decisions ore form distinguished groups of cases. It may therefore be justified to 
focus on the mentioned categories of cases, cases pertaining to human rights and 
democratic participation.
87) After the coup of 2006 the CC lost the competence to decide in asset concealment 
cases which has been shifted to the Supreme Court, what, in way, was a punishment 
for the handling of this competence in a famous case against Thaksin in 2001. See 
Vitit Muntarbhorn, “Deconstructing the 2007 Constitution”, in: Funston (ed.), Divided 
over Thaksin, pp.80, 83. But the ordinary justice contributes also indirectly to the 
project of disciplining democratic participation. For example does the practice of using 
defamation law hamper both the open political debate including the media’s ability 
and willingness to comment on it as a precondition of elective democracy in general 
and the criticism of the judicial practice of the dispositif being protected by the use 
of contempt of court in particular.
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and even gangsterism especially in local politics, partly it also reinforces a specific 
political narrative which is describing the dark side of Thai constitutionalism, 
nurtured especially since the 1990s in Thailand. This narrative deals with the issue 
of the “dirty game” of elective democracy, which is countered by the ideology of 
“Thai style democracy” and “democratic regime of government with the King as 
Head of State” and connected to the guardian role of the military. 
  Interestingly, most of the cases reinforcing the dispositif in the strongest way, 
namely the removal of elected office holders and the dissolution of political 
parties, are inclining to be routine cases due to the kind of procedure applied. 
Here, the routine procedure normally leads to the decision automatically on the 
basis of fact finding and the preparation of the Election and Counter Corruption 
Commission respectively. This counts for party dissolutions, especially related to 
reporting mistakes, and to asset declaration cases concerning elected office holders. 
Some other case variations concerning party dissolutions or the removal from 
office open space for substantial legal consideration. In other words, the same 
legal consequence, the removal from office, can be drawn due to a mere formal 
routine execution on the basis of fact finding, in particular in asset concealment 
cases, as well as due to legal interpretation for instance to answer the question if 
a member of parliament could be elected while being in custody. Across to this 
distinction according to the way the legal consequence is achieved, cases dealing 
with party dissolutions or the removal of officials can also be classified according 
to their effect on politics. While most of them remain on the level of a certain 
constitutional normality, others have been heavily divisive and affected mega- 
politics. 
  Finally, there are some other cases pertaining to democratic participation and 
the concept of democracy, which remain on the level of a certain constitutional 
normality and are dealing with other constellations than with party dissolutions 
and removals from office. 
  All in all, decisions directly contributing to the discourse of elective democracy 
are forming probably the most remarkable subject of activity in terms of coherent 
influences of cases types the Thai CCs dealt with.
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  From this point of view the changing role of the Thai CC since 2007, which 
has been described in terms of a judicalization of politics initiated by the coup 
makers, appears in a more differentiated light as the change seems to be more a 
gradual one than it reflects a substantive new concept of review powers. As far as 
the functional understanding of constitutional review is concerned, the CC post 
2007 just performed more stringently along the lines of the old discourse. At 
heart, the fundamental change is not so much the definition of any new role of 
the CC but the fact, that the fears of the evils of elective democracy has become 
true and concrete with a mass movement which demands changes in a way which 
was unthinkable in 2006 yet. 
  Therefore it is only natural that the judiciary in general was given more formal 
influence by the 2007 Const. in the attempt to balance out and adjust the state 
powers in a way which aimed to prevent a coming back of Thaksin on the basis 
of populism enabled by elective democracy.88) But the very function of constitutional 
jurisprudence from the perspective of Thai constitutionalism has always been the 
same, even if the CC between 2001 and 2006 was less reliable in some cases. 
    aa) Disciplining of Elective Democracy on a Routine Basis 
  Numerous are the cases in which the CCs fulfilled their function in disciplining 
elective democracy using their competences to dissolve political parties and 
remove elected officials due to purely formal reasons as to failures in submitting 
necessary notifications and reports. These cases are considered here as routine 
cases as explained above. Strictly formal, thus effectively decided on the basis of 
fact finding, have been firstly most of the party dissolution cases. Exceptions are 
the dissolution of the former governing party (TRT) after the coup d’etat 2006 as 
it was legally doubtful if retroactive law of the coup makers could be applied and 
the respective cases against the DP as formal obstacles appeared which had to be 
88) See Chairat Charoensin-o-larn, “Military Coup and Democracy in Thailand”, in 
Funston (ed.), Divided over Thaksin, pp.49, 68. The presidents of the highest courts 
are now involved in the selection of the appointed (not elected) Senators (which form 
around one half of the upper house) and members of the independent watchdog 
bodies under the constitution. 
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considered.89) All in all, political parties have been dissolved around eighty times90), 
while dissolutions recommended by the EC have been denied in only three cases, 
－ all of them concerning the Democrat Party.91) The sharpness of the dissolution 
option lies in the ease to be dissolved on purely formal grounds but also to be 
hold responsible as a mass organization for individual wrong doings, followed by 
the automatic dissolution of the whole party and the disqualification of all 
executive board members: According to Sect. 237 Para. 2 Const. 2007, if 
convincing evidence appears that a member of the executive board of a political 
party connives or neglects for instance that a candidate of his or her party 
committed a violation of the party law, for example by vote buying or unfair 
campaigning, all executive board members shall be suspended for the period of 
five years from politics. Consequently a single － even if minor － infringement 
of one candidate combined with the negligent unawareness of one board member 
can eliminate hundreds of politicians from political life for five years without any 
proof or even allegation that they did anything wrong. The Thaksin camp 
experienced the devastating power of this mechanism when its parties have been 
dissolved two subsequent times, resulting in more than one hundred of banned 
89) Tellingly the substantial concerns due to the ban on retroactivity could be overcome 
with the same formalistic ease for the disadvantage of the TRT as the purely 
formalistic concerns in the Democrat Party dissolution case worked for the party.
90) There are three reasons for party dissolutions, firstly political inactivity, irrelevance 
(less than 5000 members) or non-compliance with formal requirements like annual 
activity reports due to the procedural requirements, secondly substantial reasons, 
namely concerning political parties which have carried out acts detrimental to national 
security or the “democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State”, 
allow foreigner to become their members, or receive illegal contributions like vote 
buying, thirdly voluntarily dissolution in particular to enable a merger with another 
party. See for the present legal status Sect. 68, 237 Const. 2007; Sect. 91-98 Organic 
Act on Political Parties. While the first case concerning the dissolution of political 
parties, one of the first cases of the CC under the Const. 1997 at all, was about the 
merger of two parties, which made the voluntary dissolution of one of them 
necessary (see Thai Constitutional Court Ruling No. 6/2541), almost all of the other 
party dissolutions belong to the first or second group.
91) See CC Ruling No.15/2553 (29
th
 November 2010), No.16/2553 (9
th
 December 2010), 
CC No.48/2554 (28
th
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politicians only after the first time. In other words, these routine cases can 
automatically affect mega-politics, especially if the governing party or the major 
opposition party are subject of ban and dissolution. Recently, in March 2012, the 
dissolution of two political parties and the subsequent ban of their executive 
committee members from politics for five years was induced because the parties 
failed to submit an activity report for the year 2009 to the political party registrar 
without giving any sufficient reason as required by Article 93 of the political 
party law.92) The harsh consequence of a rather petty omission and the routine 
based action of the CC are the remarkable characteristics of these cases. They are 
normally not affecting important political parties but sending a steady signal about 
the way the constitution perceives and handles political parties in general. This 
complements the fact that the law creates the potential of a deadly weapon against 
any political party due to the high probability to find a reason to dissolve it.
  A contribution to the symbolic dimension of these mechanisms is also the ease 
with which the law is routinely used in political communication to threaten or 
discredit the respective opponent. Immediately after the last national election 2011 
for instance a candidate from the DP who is a lawyer, requested the EC to 
dissolve the victorious Puea Thai Party (PTP), the third subsequent and the third 
subsequently victorious party set up by the Thaksin camp. The petition claimed 
that the PTP was run by a banned politician, as the elder brother of the present 
Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, and ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra and 
other banned members of the dissolved TRT/PPP advised the campaign of the 
PTP.93) It was obvious that the allegation was founded but not less obvious that it 
would apply in a way to virtually all more important Thai parties which were 
successors of dissolved parties after the coup, two of them including the most 
important coalition partners of the DP while leading the government.94) Not long 
92) See Bangkok Post 28/03/2012.
93) See Nirmal Ghosh, “Legal bid to dissolve winning Puea Thai Party”, The Straits 
Times 09/07/2011, latest accessed at http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?sec=1&id=19865 
on 14/06/2012.
94) Most striking is the example of Newin Chidchob, who was not only banned for 5 
years as TRT executive board member, but remains the only politician ever caught on 
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ago, conversely, it was the meanwhile governing PTP which threatened to apply 
for a dissolution of the DP because of unfair campaigning practices during the 
recent elections.95) 
  Routine cases have been secondly those cases concerning the removal of 
officials because of wrongly declared assets. Most of them did not turn out to 
affect mega politics even if some of them caused debate. Especially during the 
first years of the court under the 1997 const. also some prominent politicians have 
been banned. Meanwhile, after the coup of 2006, the mandate to handle these 
cases has been shifted from the CC to the Supreme Court, Criminal Division for 
Politicians. But it is still the CC which is in charge to remove officials or to rule 
on the membership of members of the National Assembly, Council of Minister 
and Election Commissioners according to Sect. 91, 182, 233 Const. 2007. The one 
office removal case on grounds of a wrong asset declaration which affected mega 
politics was a case against then Prime Minister Thaksin. The alleged failure of the 
CC to handle the case appropriate became the reason to shift these cases to the 
Supreme Court. All in all, some dozen politicians have been removed from their 
office and banned five years from politics because of wrong declarations of their 
assets.
  Another category of removal from office-cases are those which are not about 
asset declarations but the necessary qualifications to hold public office. Two 
substantially similar cases may be exemplary selected.96) The first one is related 
tape engaged in illegal electoral practices and switched sides after the second party of 
the Thaksin camp, the PPP, was banned in 2008 to form a coalition with the 
Bhumjaithai Party which he controlled as de facto leader and the DP in spite of 
being banned from politics. Without his party the DP would not have been able to 
gain the majority after the CC dissolved the PPP and banned more than hundred of 
its politicians. His father even became chairman of the House of Representatives.
95) See The Nation 12/03/2012.
96) These two cases while dealing with similar problems have been decided at the very 
beginning of constitutional review in Thailand on the one hand and very recently on 
the other. In the meanwhile politicians lost their office again and again, sometimes 
low profile politicians, sometimes important functionaries, after the coup 2006 mainly 
pertaining to the Thaksin camp. Beside the example of Prime Minister Samak, as 
case which belongs in the category ‘mega politics’, especially the first elected 
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to a major power broker, the already mentioned Newin Chidchop, and the other 
one to one of the core leaders of the redshirt movement and one of the main 
representatives of the redshirt movement in parliament.
  These two cases demanded the CCs to interpret the constitution in similar even 
if not identical case constellations, dealing with the qualification of parliamentarians 
and ministers respectively when they have been detained or sentenced to 
imprisonment respectively. The first case, decided very early by the first CC in 
1998, dealt with a political key figure, then deputy minister Newin who joined 
several parties and has supported both present political basic-camps subsequently. 
He had been sentenced by a provincial court because of defamation of a competitor 
in his home province according to the very strict practice to handle the defamation 
law in political dispute, another mechanism disciplining elective democracy. As 
Newin had been convicted to a six-month jail-term, which had been suspended by 
the court, the President of the House of Representatives requested the CC for a 
ruling if Newin had lost his qualification to be member of the government. In 
fact, Sect. 216 Para 4 Const. 1997 stated this for the case that a cabinet member 
would be sentenced with imprisonment. According to the Court convictions 
punished only by suspended sentences did not fulfill the constitutional requirements 
for disqualification as they “should not be deemed as his or her being 
imprisoned”.97) This controversial decision was issued by a split seven-to-six vote 
which was heavily criticized. In those days, the ruling is from June 1999, Newin 
has been the leader of one of the smaller parties in the coalition government 
headed by the influential but battered Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai and his 
Democrat Party. Under the critics was even former Thai Prime Minister Anand 
Panyarachun, who headed the 44-member committee that drafted the new constitution 
government of the Thaksin camp after the coup, the said Samak administration, lost 
several important figurers before Samak himself was removed from premiership. 
While Public Health Minister and close Thaksin ally Chaiya Sasomsub has been 
removed because to declare his wife’s 50 per cent holding in a private company, 
another ally, former House Speaker Yongyuth Tiyapairat was banned from politics 
for five years for vote buying, before finally Samak himself was removed.
97) CC Ruling 36/2542, 15
th
 June 1999.
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and who, among many other profound voices, made clear that the ruling had been 
against the clear and obvious intention of the drafters of the constitution.98) The 
fact, that one of the seven judges who voted in Newin’s favour was facing 
criminal proceedings and therefore the risk of a suspended jail term himself 
contributed further to the negative effect the ruling had on the image of the court.99)
  Contrary to the Newin case the second CC very recently ruled in May 2012 
that Jatuporn Prompan had to be disqualified as member of parliament according 
to Section 106 (4), 101 (3) Const. 2007 according to which the qualification for 
the mandate depends on party membership.100)
  According to the CC, under the Political Party Act, a party member who is 
lawfully detained immediately loses his or her party membership if this prevents 
him or her from voting in general elections. In fact, on election day Jatuporn  
had been detained in Bangkok Remand Prison on terrorism charges related to the 
2010’s red-shirt protests which have been cracked down by the government. His 
request for bail to leave the prison for vote was denied by the court. Neither any 
general principle concerning democratic participation, nor the fact, that Jatuporn 
who was later on been released on bail, officially requested to enable him the 
vote by bail, was substantially considered. Noticeable is that he was not 
sentenced, thus it would have been adequate to discuss if he was not protected by 
the presumption of innocence, a principle the CC reflected on only six weeks 
earlier in a politically neutral case that will be mentioned below.101) 
    bb) Divisive Decisions on Mega-politics 
  It’s the nature of cases affecting mega politics that they are perceived with 
more attention than those dealing with less important issues even if they may 
sometmes tell the same or even more about the function of CCs. The latter could 
be argued for Thailand in particular, where especially the routine cases are 
 98) See Klein, The Battle for the Rule of Law in Thailand, p.32; Boonthan Sakanond, 
“Rulings Pull Rug From Political Reforms”, Bangkok Post 05/07/1999.
 99) See ibid. 
100) See CC Ruling No. 10/2555 (2012).
101) See CC Ruling No. 12/2555 (2012).
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pointing to the outline of a central dispositif of the political in the country 
existing since long before the 2006 coup. However, as the few cases concerning 
mega politics have attracted most of the international attention paid to Thai CCs 
they may be reflected here only briefly and on selective basis. 
  Even if there is no final list of top cases some have been clearly affected the 
course and even the fate of the country’s development in the way that determined 
the fundamentals of political power and it is telling that they did not contribute 
anything to any problem of dogmatic doctrine or conceptual understanding. These 
decisions have been highly divisive if they did not already meet an audience 
which was already so deeply divided that the reaction of critics was tempered by 
exhaustion or received with a stance of cynical expectation. 
  It is remarkable that all of the most divisive and important decisions of the CC 
pertained to mega-politics. Moreover, almost all decisions on mega politics in 
Thailand are explicitly decisions on democratic participation within the paradigm 
of disciplined elective democracy and not, for instance, on rights and duties of 
different state powers. This is far from being self-evident, keeping in mind that 
the most divisive decisions in many other countries are pertaining to value 
conflicts or issues like foreign policy or national security. Moreover, there are no 
principle-based considerations or discussions of possible interpretations and deductions 
from constitutional principles as the dominating concept of democracy especially, 
be it representative or Thai-style, in these decisions. 
  In substance Thai CCs made mega-politics dealing with the removal of political 
office holders particularly in two cases, both affecting persons who have been 
Prime Minister of Thailand during the trial. Other two decisions making mega- 
politics have been dealing with the dissolution of political parties, in both times 
the then governing party, namely two subsequently formed parties belonging to the 
Thaksin-camp, TRT and PPP. Right now, the dissolution of the third party of the 
Thaksin-camp, Thailand’s governing PTP, appears as possible soon (see below C. 
II). Especially the party dissolution cases are contrasted by decisions on the 
required dissolutions of the DP and complemented by the annulation of an election 
which has been won by the TRT in 2006.
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  All in all, cases which may be qualified as dealing with mega politics are 
allocated over the whole period of constitutional review in Thailand, whereas the 
coup of 2006 marks a certain demarcation line with an increased number since 
then. During the first period under the 1997 Const., the first case clearly pertaining 
to mega politics occurred directly after Thaksin had been elected to become Prime 
Minister the first time in 2001, the second at the very end of his premiership, 
short before the coup, in 2006. The other four to six cases occurred after 2006, 
judged by the Constitutional Tribunal in 2007 and the Constitutional Court from 
2008 to 2012.
  The two cases dealing with the removal of Prime Ministers, the Thaksin 
asset-concealment case and the Samak cookery-show case, are similar according to 
the legal consequence under consideration but different not only according to the 
result. While Thaksin was discharged by the first court despite severe evidence, 
Samak was impeached by the present court in a questionable decision. Different 
have also been the respective legal procedures as the first case has been an asset 
declaration case decided on the basis of fact finding, while the Samak case had to 
be decided based on an interpretation of substantial law similar to the cases 
against Newin and Jatuporn. 
  The Thaksin concealment case first has been a routine case embedded in a very 
difficult political environment from the point of view of the young CC. When the 
result of the ruling deviated from the statistical rule that normally governed 
comparative routine cases in which the CC always confirmed the fact finding of 
the NCCC and approved the required removal, the Court in this case faced an 
outcry that damaged the institution’s image in a way that should never be 
overcome. The encounter of a routine case in factual and substantial respect and 
an exceptional result with consequences on mega politics was the essence of the 
scandal that broke out and tainted the trust in the newly established CC. What 
was the case about? The case was stemming from the time in which Thaksin was 
Deputy Prime Minister in the Chavalit government in 1996 but tried after Thaksin 
became Prime Minister of Thailand in 2001. The political environment in 2001 
was still marked by the severe social and economic consequences of the Asian 
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crisis of 1997.102) Thaksin had become the “white knight” in difficult times from 
the very beginning of his tenure. In January 2001, Thaksin’s TRT had won 248 
seats out of the 500 contested, promptly absorbing some smaller parties and even 
a quite big one (Seritham, Chart Patthana, New Aspiration Party). This guaranteed 
a comfortable majority and even stable government.103) Thaksin immediately 
appeared as a different sort of politician, who coined his own political brand, the 
CEO-style, and was able to implement three innovations in Thai political life: the 
set up of effective reform dynamics, which have been perceived by a growing 
number of people as a breath of fresh air after the disappointing beginnings of the 
new democracy under the 1997 constitution, the consolidation of alliances of 
reform-orientated experts from different political origins under his firm rule and 
finally the building up of wide-ranging popular support from various segments of 
society. When the CC received the case from the NCCC which had voted 8 : 1 in 
favor of indicting Thaksin, all the hope put on him seemed to face an abrupt end. 
In this atmosphere heavy lobbying started conducted by highly respected “senior 
figures” including a former chief of the Supreme Court and senior commercial 
bankers, but also dynamic civil society forces, forces which later decisively 
mobilized against Thaksin together with other groups under the joint label PAD, 
known as yellow-shirt movement.104) It is noteworthy that the result of the NCCC 
findings was already known before the 2001 election, whereas Thaksin took the 
102) After all the economic crisis had already proven to have the power to bring a Suhar 
to down in Indonesia and to catalyze the political divide in Malaysia starting with 
the rift between Prime Minister Mahathir and his Deputy Anwar, then of the 
governing party followed by the whole society and which is still lingering on.
103) Especially compared with the previous Chuan government of a Democrat Party-lead 
shaky six-party coalition. The latter had been supported by 12 independent defectors 
from a seventh party, Prachakorn Thai party. This party had officially decided not to 
cooperate with the Chuan government and tried to punish the defectors which was 
leading to an interesting case of the CC. See the CC ruling 20/2544, dated 3. 
August 2001. In the previous general elections of 1996 the victorious New 
Aspiration Party had won only 125 and the second strongest Democrat Party 123 
seats, what later on enabled the Chuan government.
104) See Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “The Tragedy of the 1997 Constitution”, in: Funston 
(ed.), Divided over Thaksin, pp.27, 32.
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opportunity to manufacture a public image as national savior with all available 
means immediately after his election: TV, radio, chat, visits of the countryside and 
a completely new social approach to the local people, all part of giant campaign 
he launched with all energy after assuming power.105) The justices received a lot 
of pressure of different kind in this context sailing between Scylla and Charybdis. 
Finally, the court came out with a decision which reflected its difficulties to 
handle the case as an entire body especially in the complicated way to count the 
votes of justices throughout the different stages of rule making process together.106) 
Consequently Thaksin was acquitted, not on grounds of merits but of facts: 
According to the assets in dispute, shares which have been allocated to “maids, 
servants, drivers, drivers, and other close persons over a period of time”, the CC 
stated that they have been managed by Thaksin’s wife “in the name of others” 
who “did not wish for others to know that they were being assisted by 
[Thaksin’s] spouse.” Thus, the CC came to the conclusion that all assets were 
those of Thaksin’s spouse only. And, this is the core argument of the decision, 
she “herself testified to the subcommittee for investigation [!] that she was not 
aware that her personal assistant had not disclosed such shares in the accounts. If 
she had examined, she should have known and made the disclosure. Therefore, it 
could be seen that even the respondent’s spouse, who was the owner of such 
shares, did not now. Therefore, how could it be concluded that the respondent 
[Thaksin] knew of the non-disclosure of such shares in the accounts?”. － This 
way of fact finding have been so different from all similar cases before and after 
the ruling that this alone would have been enough to cause the scandal, which 
was accompanied by some more circumstances discussed below (C. II). Many 
observers found this decision to be the original sin of Thai constitutionalism under 
the 1997 Const. committed by the institution which once was supposed to be the 
guardian of the constitution. It is maybe the irony of the following course of the 
105) Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, “Thaksin’s Populism”, in: Journal of Contemporary 
Asia, Vol. 38, No. 1, Feb. 2008, pp.62, 65.
106) Seven judges found Thaksin being guilty, the other eight who ruled in favor of him 
included four who denied the CC’s jurisdiction on the matter and another four who 
acquitted him from knowing about the asset concealment.
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thus tainted Thai constitutionalism that all other CC cases pertaining mega politics 
later on turned against Thaksin who had been favored by the first, and like the 
others fatal, decision on mega politics. So it came that Prime Minister Samak was 
removed from office by the subsequent CC under the 2007 const. in 2008. After 
the first general elections following the coup d’etat in the end of 2007 the second 
party of the Thaksin camp, the PPP, even heavily disadvantaged during the 
election campaign, gained surprising 233 from 480 seats. While the DP remained 
as opposition party with 165 seats, the PPP formed again a strong coalition 
government backed by 315 seats. The new government was headed by Samak 
Sundaravej, a former right- wing nationalist, who openly acted as Thaksins proxy 
as the ousted Prime Minister had been banned from politics and was outside the 
country facing criminal charges because of alleged misuse of his power as PM.107) 
After Samak took over, several charges were prepared against him when the first 
strike, a request to remove him from office because of the allowance he received 
for a weekly cookery show on TV, was already successful. Substantially the case 
was about the question if the Prime Minister violated Sect. 267 of the Const. 
2007 forbidding members of the cabinet to be “employees of any person” in order 
to enable the proper exercise of his functions by avoiding conflicts of interest.108)  
  The CC argued not very extensively, being focused on the question, if the 
Prime Minister had become an employee. As the legal definition according to the 
Civil and Commercial Code, labor law － or tax law code seemed to give a too 
narrow interpretation of the term to include the cooking PM, the CC declared 
107) In some respects there a parallel between the political role and fate of Thaksin in 
Thailand and Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan who also challenged the established system 
on a populist platform and ended up in jail, with the difference that the change in 
power in Taiwan was enabled via elections.
108) See the CC Ruling 12-13/2551, 9
th
 Sept. 2008, fully translated in European-Asian 
Journal of Law and Governance (EAJLG), Vol. 1, No. 1 (2011), pp.110ff. Sect. 267 
constitution 2007 states: “The provisions of section 265 shall apply to the Prime 
Minister and Ministers, except for the holding of position or an act to be done under 
the provisions of law. The Prime Minister and Ministers shall neither hold any 
position in a partnership, a company or an organisation carrying out business with a 
view to sharing profits or incomes nor being an employee of any person.”
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these laws, as ranking lower in status than the constitution, to be inapplicable on 
the case which required a definition matching the rationale of the constitution － 
and instead was found to be served well by the definition of a general dictionary. 
This was enough to become the lever to remove the Prime Minister of Thailand 
from office.109) 
  Interesting cases pertaining mega-politics have been also the party dissolution 
cases in which the governing parties of the Thaksin camp have been dissolved, 
the TRT after the coup d’etat in 2007 and the PPP after the first election after 
the enforcement of the new constitution of 2007 in 2008. The dissolution of the 
PPP in 2008 followed the removal of Prime Minister Samak and ended the 
premiership of his successor Prime Minister Somchai, when a splinter group of his 
party under Newin changed sides forming a coalition government with the Democrat 
Party.110) With the subsequent ban of both parties set up by the Thaksin camp, 
the complete senior level politicians of the Thaksin camp have been banned from 
politics for five years without any necessary proof of a personal wrongdoing. 
More interesting in several respects had been the case of the first party of the 
Thaksin camp, the TRT dissolution in the aftermath of the coup. A week before 
the scheduled verdict, the King gave a speech to the Supreme Administrative 
Court Judges, led by the then president of the Supreme Administrative Court, who 
concurrently served as vice-president of the Constitutional Tribunal (while the 
president of the Supreme Court acted as the Tribunal’s president).111) In this 
speech, which was televised on all national TV channels simultaneously on the 
evening of the 24 May 2007 the King asked the country’s supreme judges “to do 
109) Interesting is a comparison of this decision with a decision of the first CC from 
2001 dealing with the respective Sect. 216 of the Const. 1997. In this case ten 
ministers of the last Chuan government had been indicted because they have been 
accused to “hold any position in a partnership, a company or an organization carrying 
out business with a view to sharing profits or incomes”. In this decision all ten 
ministers of the Democrat Party government have been acquitted from all accusations 
by the CC. See CC Ruling 4/2544, 6
th
 Feb. 2001.
110) See CC Ruling 20/2551, 2
nd
 Dec. 2008.
111) Charoensin-o-larn, “Military Coup and Democracy in Thailand”, in Funston (ed.), 
Divided over Thaksin, pp.49, 58.
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their best for the country yet brace themselves for heavy criticism”112): “Whatever 
court you belong to, judges need to make the right interpretation, otherwise the 
country will be doomed. […] You can only decide within your heart whether the 
Constitutional Tribunal makes the right ruling. […] If they are wrong, there will 
be trouble whether or not political parties remain. I have the answer in my heart 
but I have no right to say it. […].”113) - In fact, there has been an attempt to 
illegally lobby certain members of the Tribunal which was discovered in August 
2007.114) Nevertheless the Constitutional Tribunal, which replaced the CC under 
the 2006 Interim Constitution, dissolved the TRT and some smaller coalition 
parties and, much more controversial, banned all executive members of the parties, 
all in all 133 (including 111 from TRT), for five years from politics.115) Under 
the Const. 1997 both legal instruments, the ban of wrongdoers and the dissolution 
of political have been known. Now, both instruments were combined in the way 
described above: violations of party law by single candidates could easily imputed 
to members of the executive committee leading to dissolution of the whole party 
and the ban of all executive board members. The legal basis for this modification 
of the old party law, the Organic Act on Political Parties (1998) was Announcement 
No. 27 of the junta, the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR), which therefore 
constituted retroactive law. The Tribunal had no problem with the principle of the 
ban on retroactivity as the respective norms of the political party law did not 
belong to criminal law.
  Another interesting aspect of the dissolution of the TRT and PPP emerged in 
connection with the rejection of the unanimous requested dissolution of the main 
political adversary of the Thaksin camp, the Democrat Party. This single political 
party which survived the recommendation of the EC to be dissolved made it three 
times, either due to the fact finding or to procedural mistakes of the EC in clear 
cases which normally left no way out from executing the strict letter of the law. 
112) Ibid.
113) Cited “King Warns of Trouble”, The Nation 25/05/2007.
114) See Charoensin-o-larn, “Military Coup and Democracy in Thailand”, in: Funston 
(ed.), Divided over Thaksin, pp.49, 59.
115) See CC Ruling 3-5/2550, 30
th
 May 2007.
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Insofar the Constitutional Tribunal in 2007 admittedly found that there have been 
“actual obstructions” of party law, but believed that “the executives and members 
of the House of Representatives of the DP did not participate in such obstructions.”116) 
Later the CC saw no other way to end two requests to dissolve the DP than to 
reject them because the EC had delayed the proceedings marginally and even 
because a wrong understanding of the formalities on the side of the EC and its 
chairman how to deliver the request correctly to the CC.117) The contrast could 
not have been stronger as one of the rejections of the dissolution of the DP due 
to the latter reason was announced at the same day when Prime Minister Samak 
was removed from his office because of his paid participation in the cookery 
show. 
    cc) Other Cases Pertaining to Democratic Participation and the Concept of 
Democracy
  Besides the cases concerning party dissolutions and removals from office there 
are some other, atypical decisions dealing with elective democracy. They can be 
classified in two groups, cases pertaining to constitutional bodies and cases 
pertaining to the citizen’s role in elective democracy. A case of the first group 
dealt with the question if defectors of a political party supporting a coalition 
government against the formal decision of their party remain qualified as 
parliamentarians after being expelled from their party on grounds of their 
disobedience. In November 1997 under the circumstances of the Asian financial 
116) See CC Ruling 1-2/2550, 30
th
 May 2007.
117) See CC Ruling 15/2551, 9
th
 Sept. 2008, fully translated in EAJLG Vol. 1, No. 1 
(2011), pp.133ff. According to the wrong procedure the CC found that the election 
commissioners had no authority to ask the Attorney-General to forward the case to 
the CC as this authority rested only with the political party registrar who is ex 
officio identical with the chairman of the EC but did not act himself. Thus the court 
decided that only the EC but not its chairman as Party Registrar recommended that 
the dissolution case should be forwarded to the Office of Attorney-General.
Very actual a new petition to dissolve the DP is pending before the CC now, this 
time based on Sect. 68 and on grounds that the DP acquired power over the 
country’s administration by unconstitutional methods in 2009. See Bangkok Post 
13/06/2012.
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crisis, the DP under their leader Chuan Leekpai formed a new government which 
became just strong enough with the support of a defector faction of the 
Prachakorn Thai Party, the so called Cobra faction. Their Party had been part of 
the previous government under Chavalit’s New Aspiration Party and formally 
decided to stay with their old partner and to refuse a cooperation with Chuan. 
Consequently the party under Samak Sundaravej, who later became Prime Minister 
for some short month in 2008, expelled the rebellious defectors after a fierce 
battle before the civil courts and a failed non-confidence vote against Chuan. The 
last chapter of the party infight was the removal of the defectors from the 
membership register of the Prachakorn Thai Party against which they were seeking 
support from the CC. The CC ruled indeed that the respective resolutions of the 
Prachakorn Thai Party, the resolution determining how the party members should 
rule in the non-confidence vote and the resolution to remove the defectors from 
the party list, had been unlawful.118) According to Sect. 47 Const. 1997 the CC 
had the competence to rule on the question if a regulation or resolution of a 
political party was contrary or inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the 
“democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State”. Based on this 
competence the CC states that the termination of the membership in the House 
would be equivalent to the determination of the Thai people’s representation by 
the respective members of parliament and therefore a hindrance to the performance 
of duties for the common interest of the Thai people as ordered by Sect. 149 
Const. 1997.119) Therefore, the CC states that the party resolution was contrary 
and inconsistent with the “democratic regime with the King as Head of State”, 
unfortunately without any further assessment in which way Sect. 149 or the 
concept of elective democracy is embedded in this central governance concept. 
Beside this and the fact that many critics saw the decision as being politically 
motivated since the support of the 12 MPs was crucial for the survival of the 
Chuan government120), the decision convinces in its result. 




120) See Sakanond, Bangkok Post 05/07/1999.
Thai Constitutional Courts and the Political Order / Glaser, Henning   137
  Two other cases in this group pertain to the duty to vote and the right to vote 
respectively.
  The first case, dealing with the duty to vote in a very special case, was 
referred to the CC by the EC to clarify the scope of the newly introduced duty to 
vote (Sect. 68 Const. 97)121) concerning the King and certain members of the 
Royal Family.122) Due to the constitutional position of revered worship of the 
King as stated in Sect. 8 Const. 97, the EC was uncertain how to handle the 
legal situation on the ground of the organic law on elections of the nation’s 
representative bodies, which stated that the respective members of the Royal 
Family were eligible voters (Art. 102, 118 Act on Elections) and also stated 
certain sanctions in the case of unexcused non  exercise of the civic duty to vote. 
Central question was if the EC was entitled to apply the general constitutional and 
legal rules concerning the duty vote to the person of the King and certain 
members of the Royal Family as it has been legally stated or not. This and any 
legal duty imposed on the King by law and sanctioned by the state was and is 
incompatible with the constitutional function and status of the King of Thailand. 
So far, it would have been probably convincing enough to base the decision alone 
on Sect. 8 of the Const. 97, quoted also by the CC among other norms and 
stating that, “the King is above politics and is enthroned in a position of revered 
worship and shall not be violated or exposed to any sort of accusation or action.” 
Concerning the King himself, the CC refers nevertheless to two further normative 
complexes of the constitution. The first is a more special one, concerning the 
question of the Royal succession, the other concerns the fundamental position of 
the Royal institution as being the centerpiece of Thai constitutionalism in general. 
This second complex consists of several key norms which are used by the court, 
121) Section 68 Const. 97 (Sect. 72 Const. 2007) states: “Every person shall have a duty 
to exercise his or her right to vote at an election.”
122) See CC No. 6/2543, 29
th
 Feb. 2000. See for a general criticism on the imposition of 
a duty to vote for already established democracies Jürgen Habermas, “Vorpolitische 
Grundlagen des modernen Rechtsstaats”, in: idem, Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion, 
Philosophische Aufsaetze, Frankfurt am Main 2005, pp.106, 109. In Thailand the duty 
to vote can be read with Habermas as an indicator for certain doubts, if elective 
democracy could be regarded as a well-performing constitutional concept.
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under them the one regulating the sovereign power in the state. 
  According to the first complex, the court refers to the “Palace Law on 
Succession” (1924) and those sections of the constitution pertaining to it, namely 
Sect. 22 and 23 Const. 97. Doing so, the court stresses the power of the King to 
amend the succession law on his own discretion according Sect. 22 Const. 97 and 
therefore to determine the conditions for the succession of the Head of State in 
his sole prerogative. According to Sect. 22 any amendments of the Palace Law on 
Succession take place on initiative of the King, are drafted by his Privy Council 
and, after being presented to His Majesty’s consideration again, are finally 
delivered to the President of the National Assembly who has to countersign them 
on the Royal Command. The subsequent Sect. 23 which is fully quoted in the 
decision as Sect. 22 before, deals with different constellations of the succession 
under which those are most interesting regulating the situation that the “Throne 
becomes vacant and the King has not appointed His Heir”. In this situation it is 
the King’s Privy Council which submits the name of the Successor to the Throne 
to Council of Ministers for further submission to the National Assembly for 
approval. The reference to these rules of royal succession is made without any 
further introduction or conclusion by the CC but nevertheless implying the final 
conclusion of the decision that there can be no duty to vote for the King. How 
the succession to Throne, the constitutional position of the King and the duty to 
vote are related to each other is not explained but expected to be understood 
self-explanatorily by the Thai audience. It is the King who has the right to decide 
about who will be the coming Head of State alone, without any substantial 
contribution of elected representatives indicating the independence of his person 
from those parts of the constitution pertaining to the concept of elective democracy. 
  Interesting among the following arguments is the statement that since the 
revolution of 1932 “all Constitutions of Thailand, including the current Constitution, 
contained a specific chapter on the King, which recognized the exceptional status 
of the Royal Establishment pursuant to the ideologies of the democratic form of 
government with the King as Head of State. The King is above politics and is 
enthroned in a position of revered worship and shall not be violated or exposed to 
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any sort of accusation or action.” The Court furthermore states that according to 
Sect. 3 Const. 1997123), stating that the sovereign powers belong to the Thai 
people and are exercised by the King as Head of state through the legislative, 
executive and judiciary according to the provisions of the constitution and that 
due to the position of the king as being “already the exerciser of sovereign 
powers there was no reason to subject him to a further duty to elect a 
representative to exercise such power.” On the basis of considerations of the 
constitutional concept of the “democratic form of government with the King as 
the Head of the State” and it’s expression in Sect. 3 and 8, and the law on 
succession, the CC sums up including the respective members of the Royal 
family:
Since the King is the exerciser of sovereign powers, maintains a standing above 
politics and political impartiality, together with the fact that in the past the King, 
Queen, and Sons and Daughters thereof never exercised any voting rights, thus if 
the King, Queen, Royal Heir and members of the Royal Family who are Royal 
Descendants of the King under the Palace Law on Succession B.E. 2467 (1924) 
having a close relationship with the King and frequently entrusted by Royal 
Command to perform functions on behalf of the King, were required to exercise 
voting rights, such a requirement would give rise to a conflict or inconsistency 
with the principles relating to upholding a standing above politics and the political 
impartiality of the King.
  Both, the arguments pertaining to the King and those pertaining to the defined 
members of the Royal family, are linked together in the final conclusion referring 
to Sect. 71 Const. 97. This norm is the first norm in Chapter V of the 
constitution, titled “Directive Principles of Fundamental State Policies” and orders 
that “the State shall protect and uphold the institution of kingship and the 
independence and integrity of its territories.” Referring to the aforementioned 
reasons and norms and “in order to uphold the Royal Establishment as per 
Section 71 of the Constitution”, the CC finally concludes that the King and the 
123) The section is identical with the respective section in the present constitution.
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defined members of the Royal family cannot have a duty to vote, so that the 
respective regulations of the election law are inapplicable to them.
  The second case of this group pertains to the right to vote and to be elected. 
According to the Const. 1997 (the same applies for the Const. 2007) Buddhist 
monks were on the one hand prohibited from voting as well as from being member 
of a political party or to be elected (see Sect. 106 Para 2, Sect. 118 Para 5, Sect. 
109 Para 3, Sect. 126 Para 4 and Sect. 133 Para 5) while on the one hand the 
freedom of religion was protected constitutionally as well as the right of equal 
treatment － without any such restrictions for the member of other religions who 
were assuming a comparable status like a monk. When a district court expelled an 
elected member of the local administration from office after his ordination as 
monk due to the provisions of the old local administration Act from 1952, the 
man refused to comply. After a district court requested a review of the respective 
act according to Sect. 264 Const. 1997 the CC stated without any substantial 
argument that the respective act did not violate the freedom of religion nor the 
right of equal treatment.124)  
  Another group of cases indirectly dealing with elective democracy are those 
concerning the right and duties of the government to cooperate with the legislative 
in certain fields of foreign policy, starting with the very first cases of the CC 
dealing with the signing of an letter of intent with the IMF by the then 
government to the second CC and its ruling on the Joint Communiqué between 
Thailand and Cambodia regulating the cooperation on a disputed border area.125) 
These cases are about the participatory rights of the legislative and therefore 
pertaining to the concept of elective democracy and democratic participation but 
are less significant as a case type like other mentioned.
b) Human Rights Cases 
  As much as the CCs have been induced to contribute continuously to the 
outline of elective democracy as low was the input the CCs gave to the system of 
124) See CC No. 44/2542, 3
rd
 August 1999.
125) See CC No. 1/2541, 23
rd
 May 1998; CC No. 6-7/2551, 8
th
 July 2008.
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human rights protection in Thailand.126) The sheer absence of any considerable 
quantity of cases in which CCs granted freedom or equality provided, it is also 
the quality of the very few exceptions to this rule which is striking: politically 
relevant rights have never been supported in favor of concrete individuals.  
  One of the very rare cases in which protection has been granted is the family 
name case, in which the CC struck down a law that required spouses to assume 
their husbands name on grounds of gender discrimination.127) This case is the one 
exception in years of review. Among all the dismissed applications one case is 
interesting because of its similarity to the family name case, both cases dealing 
with gender equality in relation to personal status. In this case Thai wives have 
been frustrated by the CC with their interest to enable their foreign husbands to 
become Thai nationals according to the same privileged rules which enabled that 
for foreign wives of Thai men. The newly introduced right of foreign women 
married to Thai men to seek Thai nationality without having to go through regular 
channels has to be seen against the background of the very narrow and complicated 
nature of these general channels. Nevertheless, the CC, after discussing the matter 
with experts from the Interior Ministry, the National Security Council, Foreign 
Ministry and academics (as mentioned above, B. I) concluded that there would be 
no discrimination if the same right given to foreign female spouses of Thai would 
be denied to foreign male spouses.128) The case is a good example for the 
politicized consideration behind the formalistic statements in the ruling. 
  Only recently, after the court was faced with the threat of becoming dissolved 
in the wake of the coming constitutional reform under the new regime, the CC, 
after a long pause, issued a protective human right decision again. As in the other 
case, the family name case, the case was politically neutral, dealing with Article 
54 of the Direct Sale and Direct Marketing Act B.E.2545, which provided for 
offenses of companies covered by the law that “in the case the offender under 
126) The general status of human rights protection in Thailand is far better than the 
relative inactivity of the CCs may provoke to assume.
127) See CC 21/2526, 5
th
 June 2003.
128) See CC No. 37/2546, 9
th
 October 2003.
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this Act is a juristic entity, the managing director, the manager, or any person 
responsible for the undertaking of the business of such entity shall be charged for 
such offense unless it is not proved that he or she is not involved in the said 
entity’s offense”. This provision, a bad indicator for foreign investors regularly 
screening the compliance conditions of countries being interesting for investment, 
was rendered as being unconstitutional by the CC because it contradicted Article 
39 Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, stating that: “The suspect or the accused in a 
criminal case shall be presumed innocent”.129) The decision is interesting because 
it used the English term ‘rule of law, even if in brackets, what was a novum, 
criticized by not a few lawyers and is indicating a new, while probably limited 
openness for human rights and an international dimension of their understanding. 
This new stance may be explainable due to unclear future of the court. If this 
thesis is right it is maybe expectable that the CC will extend the scope of its 
human rights protection in the coming months while facing the reactions of the 
very recent interference in the ongoing amendment process which will be discussed 
below (C. II).
  Anyway, until now, Thai CCs did not assume an active role in human right 
protection cases. Among the reasons may be the fact that human right protection 
has simply been not so much the rationale of constitutional review. Important 
seems also the fact that the prevailing normative concept of human rights seems 
also not to support a strong protective stance. Insofar the CCs seem to share the 
dominant understanding that civic rights are not human rights in an universalistic 
sense, even if this understanding of the concept was occasionally discussed. 
During the drafting process of the 1997 constitution the question came up for 
instance if human rights should be acknowledged only for Thai or (at least 
partially) for everybody. While many NGO’s involved have supported an universalistic 
notion of human rights and proposed to name chapter III as “Rights and Liberties 
of the Person”, most of the parliamentarians who generally adopted an attitude to 
slow down the reformist stance of the NGO - supported progressive constitutionalism, 
favored a more nationalist notion of human rights, aiming to provide the respective 
129) See CC 12/2555, 28
th
 March 2012.
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“Rights and Liberties” only for the Thai people.130) This latter understanding has 
prevailed in the legal and public discourse until today and has rarely been 
challenged, leaving aside the mentioned claims of universality by academics and 
demonstrators alienated to red-shirt movement in the context of the smouldering 
political divide. So far, there has been only one case before the first CC in which 
the restrictive interpretation of human rights has been challenged in a case which 
was referred to the CC by the Chon Buri Provincial Court dealing with the 
complaint of an imprisoned Japanese citizen against the permanent use of shackles 
as a violation of his human rights. However, the case eventually has not been 
decided because the defendant had been extradited before to Japan.131)  
D. The Constitutional Court in Dispute and Perception
  Finally the positioning of CCs for the political order may be reflected in terms 
of their public perception in particular according to the disputed role they assumed 
in ordering the political and the challenges and problems resulting from it. 
I. Between Self-restraint and Induced Activism
  While especially the first CC performed quite reliable on the routine level, it 
disappointed in cases pertaining to mega politics. The perception of its performance 
130) See Vitit Muntarborn, “Human Rights in the era of ‘Thailand Incorporated (Inc.)”, 
in: Randall Peerenboom, Carol J. Petersen, Albert H. Y. Chen (eds.), Human Rights 
in Asia, A Comparative Legal Study of Twelve Asian Jurisdictions, France and USA, 
New York and London 2006, p.324; The more ‘nationalist’ notion of human rights 
was supported by one of the most influential members of the Constitution Drafting 
Assembly (CDA), Professor Bowornsak Uwanno, but can be traced back to a 
traditional opinion in Thai constitutional law, represented for example by Prof. Yud 
Sanguthai. See the Summarized Report of the Constitution Drafting Commission at 
Imperial Queenspark Hotel on 17th-20th May 1997, Professor Bowornsak Uwanno, 
p.25 (In Thai); Yud Sanguthai, Explanation of Constitution (B.E. 2511). Articles and 
explanations of constitutional law in general, p.103 (in Thai).
131) See CC Ruling No. 3/2544, in The Constitutional Court Rulings, 2001-2002, p.7.
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was marked by the latter. The second CC was perceived less ambiguous but in 
much more divided manner. Despite the split between those who accepted the 
rulings and those who fundamentally disagreed both, supporters and critics, mainly 
agreed that the CC functioned reliably especially in cases concerning mega politics 
according to its mission. Both CC have never been accused to capitalize their 
duty to make a name for their institution. Both did not look for the battles they 
had to fight. Nevertheless, both courts were involved in such heavy battles, the 
first one in the “battle for the rule of law” (James Klein), the present one in the 
battle for the “democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State”. 
While the first CC failed because its restraint to make mega-politics in a dramatic 
moment even if the constitution required this, it is the characteristic for the 
present CC that it operated reliably in way which could be perceived as induced 
activism.
II. Challenges and Problems
  Finally, it is interesting to ask for challenges and problems of the CCs as resulting 
from their performance. Significant is first of all, what has not been raised at first 
top when it came to discussions about challenges and problems of Thai constitutional 
review. Insofar, different for example from the German Federal CC in its infancy, 
the relation of workload and a deficient institutional outfit has not been discussed 
as an existential problem for both institutions. Nor did the court face one of the 
problems many young CCs in evolving democracies did: an insufficient base of 
suitable educated lawyers, a problem what the Cambodian Constitutional Council 
for instance faces, or any accusation of persisting individual corruption of Justices 
based on personal greed. Given that the CC commands the necessary material 
resources, is able to draw on a comparatively wide and professional pool of 
potential justices whose authority is not shaken by the perception of wide spread 
corruption, and is additionally vested with a wide range of competences, the main 
field of contestation has been and is the very performance of the court as such. 
For the present court it is problematic and challenging according to two 
interrelated aspects, the lack of a convincing methodological approach reflected by 
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a consistent case record and the fact, that the handling of politically sensitive 
cases has hardly any chance to meet acceptance across the political divide. 
Especially the latter aspect is essential for the general assessment of the CC 
which has to rely on a certain social trust and public authority maybe even more 
than other constitutional institutions to be able to function as a court is per 
definitionem expected to be impartial. An indicator for any practice to handle 
politically sensitive cases in an overall convincing manner is the absence of 
scandal or deep and fundamental rejection of the court’s performance by wide 
parts of the population. However, here exactly lies the problem of both of the 
Thai courts, while the conditions changed from the first to the second court. 
While the first CC turned out to be too weak to function according to its 
institutional logic, the second court got into troubled water because of exercising 
this institutional logic without the necessary methodological sophistication. The 
failure of the first CC is symbolically reflected by the most controversial case, 
which turned out to become a veritable scandal, the Thaksin asset declaration 
case. Given the fact, that no CC receives its authority automatically but has to 
emancipate from the usual restraints of competing constitutional players as well as 
other supreme courts, the failure is understandable for a young CC operating in 
the framework of a similar young democracy and against the background of an 
increasingly strong government based on populist rule. The second court had not 
so much to prove its institutional independence against an overwhelming 
successful adversary but to continue the defeat of the unleashed forces of popular 
backed elective governance, which was organized by the regrouping conservative 
forces after the coup of 2006. Meanwhile the distrust had got a face and the 
perceived threat for the autochthon Thai concept of good governance evolved in 
reality, when more and more parts of the population refused to chose in favor of 
it after the coup. In this context and from this perspective decisions which seem 
to be strange from a foreign perspective have been predictable and expected 
within the constitutional system which produced them. Not scandal but fundamental 
rejection by a significant part of the population and a merely political instead of 
legal affirmation by those who supported the results was the mere consequence, 
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amounting not to an institutional but to a constitutional crisis, which is going on. 
  From this perspective the Thaksin case as a veritable institutional scandal of the 
first CC and the highly disputed performance of the second CC in cases concerning 
mega politics which were leading not so much to scandals but an actual 
constitutional crisis shall be briefly reflected. Beside their impact on the perception 
of the respective Court’s performance the events discussed here in relation to the 
two courts have something more in common: both have been leading to attempts 
to impeach CC justices in charge, one time unsuccessful while the other time, 
pertaining to the ongoing constitutional crisis in Thailand, is now, the problem 
still open. 
  1. The Thaksin Asset Declaration Case 2001
  Pertaining to the Thaksin case it is only one facet which shall briefly be 
regarded, that is the scandal it caused, some of its expressions and concomitants. 
The veritable scandal which accompanied the CC’s decision is shaped by the fact 
that the controversial decision came up in an environment in which the 
fundamental divide between the two political camps did not emerge yet. All in all 
the favorable judgment for Thaksin appeared as a scandal of institutional failure 
which was accepted also by those who had been not Thaksin’s allies but people 
who put their hope for national recovery after the economic crisis on him, while 
conservative as well as progressive adversaries saw the Const. 1997 in the 
moment failing the court announced its decision. This original sin of the 1997 
constitutional system was not disputed between two ideological camps in terms of 
competing constitutionalism but by allies and pragmatics on the one hand and 
critics of a single scandalous decision on the other. The scandal was possible 
because the CC was not ready to face the challenge to decide about the country’s 
fate by sacking a popular leader with a promising agenda to solve the nation’s 
problems. The failure of the legal procedures on the constitutional level prompted 
legal reaction. The NCCC, which unsuccessfully had asked the CC to impeach 
Thaksin, launched an inquiry on a motion of former Democrat Party secretary-general 
Maj.-Gen. Sanan Kachornprasart whether there have been grounds to impeach four 
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of the Constitutional Court judges who ruled in favor of Thaksin.132) When three 
of them petitioned in reaction to the favorable ruling an Administrative Court 
order to stop the proceedings the Administrative Court dismissed the case stating 
that it had no jurisdiction to intervene in the impeachment proceedings as 
prescribed in the constitution.133) On the other hand, eight “majority judges” of 
the Constitutional Court, who had acquitted Thaksin of the assets- concealment 
charges, filed a libel suit against “senior citizen” Prasong Soonsiri in 2002 for his 
criticism of the verdict. The case against Prasong is interesting in particular 
retrospectively from a postcoup perspective. In 2006 Prasong, a former head of 
the National Security Council, military intelligence officer, and trustee of circles 
close to the palace, became one of the key figures of the coup d’etat.134) As a 
leading member of the new military appointed National Legislative Assembly 
(NLA) he was influential in the making of the new constitution. Not too long 
ago, in September 2011, he was among those, who warned a group of academics 
of Thammasat University who argued for a mitigating amendment of the lèse 
majesté section 112 of the Criminal Code that their campaign could lead to 
another military coup.135) Interestingly, it has been the libel suit against Prasong 
132) According to ruling 31/2543, dated from 10
th
 August 2000, the CC found that Maj- 
Gen. Sanan had also concealed assets, which have been linked to alleged corruption. 
After losing his office Sanan resigned also from the Democrat Party.
133) See The Nation 10/10/2003.
134) See Rodney Tasker, “Grumbles, revelations of a Thai coup maker”, Asia Times online 
at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HL22Ae02.html, latest accessed 14/06/2012.
135) See Bangkok Post 27/09/2011. Prasong is interesting also as an early and somehow 
representative adversary of Thaksin even if in an ambiguous way. On the one hand 
he is considered as one of the “good and capable men”, a convinced royalist and 
staunch supporter of the anti-western narrative of the two kinds of democracy as 
being reflected by the constitution of 2007. As a supporter of the PAD, the so called 
yellow shirts, which are combining their mission to protect the royal institution with 
a much more distinct criticism of elective democracy than the DP and which 
boycotted the last national elections, he is reported to regard Thaksin as the most 
dangerous manifestation of a corrupt leader in the wake of elective democracy who 
disrespects the monarchy. On the other hand it is significant for Thai politics in 
general but also the shift within it, that Thaksin started his career not only at the 
side of two of his later main adversaries from the PAD but also in the same 
political party, the Buddhist Palang Dharma, power of dharma-party, in which 
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in 2002 during which some circumstances of the CC decision have been revealed 
before the criminal court, which were heating up the scandal, leading not only to 
the mentioned calls for impeachment including the attempt to impeach the judges 
by the CC itself136) but also criminal persecutions after some witnesses, including 
a chief judge from an appeal court, testified under oath heavy lobbying efforts by 
the Thaksin camp.137) Significant for the environment of the scandal is the fact 
that Thaksin was not yet identified as the very enemy of the Thai concept of 
constitutionalism like he was since 2005. In 2001 most of the people supported 
him as the white knight who appeared to safe the nation, while others saw just a 
politician who seemed to be more talented in using the mechanisms of elective 
democracy in his self-serving interest than others. Nevertheless, he was not 
regarded as being disrespectful to the royal institution by the wide public and, 
moreover, still aligned with two of his later arch enemies, Maj.-Gen. Chamlong 
Srimuang and media mogul Sondhi Limthongkhul, who both strongly and 
demonstratively supported Thaksin at this day, one in and the other before the 
courtroom, both mobilizing their political supporters to pressure the court.138) 
Prasong was an important member. Nevertheless the party nominated Thaksin as a 
newcomer in 1994 to take over Prasong’s position as foreign minister. Noteworthy, 
Palang Dharma before Thaksin came on board, was the junior partner of the DP led 
Chuan-government until Palang Dharma left the coalition voting for non-confidence 
against the DP Prime Minister Chuan, to form a coalition with the opposition, the 
government in which Thaksin served as foreign minister.
136) There has even been a request of the President of the National Assembly to the CC 
according to Sect. 266 Const. 1997 if the Senate could ask the NCCC to launch an 
impeachment procedure against the four judges of CC who voted in favor of 
Thaksin to be handled then by the CC itself after a petition of more than fifty 
thousands eligible voters to remove the judges from office was made. The CC ruled 
that the procedure according to Sect. 266 was not admissible as there has been no 
dispute between the state agencies. See CC Ruling 15/2545, dated 25
th 
April 2002. 
The alternative move before the Administrative Court failed also as mentioned above.
137) See The Nation at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/PRASONG-LIBEL-CASE-Ura- 
decides-not-to-aid-defence--107613.html, latest accessed 14/06/2012.
138) See Pongsudhirak, “The Tragedy of the 1997 Constitution”, in: Funston (ed.), Divided 
over Thaksin, pp.27, 32. The same two leaders later on formed the PAD against 
Thaksin, Sondhi after business disputes came up, and mobilized the yellow masses 
against him, calling for a royal intervention dismissing the prime minister and, after 
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Therefore, the scandal in this time has not yet been an expression of the severe 
divide which the Thai society it facing today but focused on the subject matter, a 
decision which deviated from the rule of law in the face of political power. The 
only ideological impact was this violation of the rule of law. 
  2. From Scandal to Constitutional Crisis: the CC 2007-2012 
  It is on the other hand significant, that there had been no comparable public 
outcry, at least not as a scandal transported and reproduced by the conventional 
media and across politically different forums of debate, when the second CC 
issued its decision in the DP dissolution case in favor of the DP. This is 
astonishing as not only the diverse party dissolution cases against the DP have 
been questionable as such but also due to two events which had all ingredients to 
emerge into a veritable scandal too. Both, the court decision as well as the two 
events have to be seen in the context of the dissolution of the second party of the 
Thaksin camp in late 2008, the PPP, which won the 2007 elections. Against the 
DP it took until 2010 for the EC to refer the case to the CC with the 
recommendation to dissolve the DP. Before the CC eventually avoided a decision 
on the merits due to the procedural failures of the EC/Party registrar mentioned 
above, the two subsequent events came up which were suitable to severely shook 
the credibility of the court. Both were caused by leaked videos indicating in one 
case a meeting of the secretary of the CC’s president with representatives of the 
DP discussion the pending case, while the second indicated that judges helped 
some relatives to get advance knowledge of questions on an examination for 
positions at the CC.139) When the information came up, there was no discursive 
reaction on the national media stage which could be considered as dealing with a 
scandal. But the perceptive horizon of the nation was also a quite different one, 
from that of 2001. The country looked back to the violent crackdown of redshirt 
protests that caused around ninety deaths and two thousands injuries. While the 
conservative side in the divided country claimed that the videos have been 
the Thaksin camp came back in 2008 for another coup d’etat. 
139) See Bangkok Pundit 24/08/2011.
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doctored to discredit the CC or avoided to raise the issue agreeing with the result, 
the other side felt just reconfirmed and saw no reason to raise it as an 
outstanding development.
  Particular interesting is the fact that the two incidents accompanying the 
decision have not been discussed and clarified by any pluralistic public discourse 
despite the fact that they had the potential to undermine the court’s credibility just 
in the moment in which all eyes were directed at it, many of them with the 
expectation of an applied double standard. 
  But even if the scandal did not evolve the message of the decision spread, less 
spectacular in form and with less ease, but it reached the public and left its 
marks. Interestingly, a survey of Suan Dusit poll institute in 2011 showed a 
problem with public trust in the CC which was even more alarming as the survey 
had been conducted in Bangkok and its neighboring provinces, thus not in those 
provinces which are known to be especially critical towards the DP. While only 
17.54% of the interviewed had a lot of confidence and around 24% some, 57% 
did have little or no confidence in the court. Reasons mentioned by this critical 
majority have been alleged double standards and political interferences.140) 
  The setting changed again when the Thaksin camp which had been banned by 
the CC into the opposition won the national election of 2011 in a landslide 
victory. Within this changed setting an ongoing constitutional crisis has been 
triggered off by the CC which came at least closer to evolve into a scandal: The 
CC had issued an order to the parliament at June 1, 2012, to halt the readings for 
a constitutional amendment between the second and the third reading of the 
amendment bill. This partly expressed, partly heated up the political conflict which 
amounted to a currently ongoing constitutional crisis between CC and government/ 
parliament. This latest case is not only a still actual one but represents also a new 
stage in the relationship between CC and government/parliament and a climax in 
the development of distrust and rejection of the institution by a big part of the 
population. A brief analysis of the case may serve a concluding model narrative 
for the topic of this article. The crisis started when the new government/parliament 
140) See ibid.
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decided to replace the so called coup-constitution of 2007. As the present 
constitution － as most others of the world too － does not foresee its own 
replacement the procedure chosen was a two-tiered one. In a first step a 
constitutional amendment was planned to assign a drafting committee which in the 
second step should work out a new constitution, which was then to pass a 
referendum. The amendment to set up a drafting committee was to be introduced 
with three other laws including a reconciliation bill. The bill shall enable national 
reconciliation after the crackdown of redshirt protests in 2010 but is feared by DP 
and PAD also to bring Thaksin back. Remarkably is that the bill was introduced 
by the coup leader of 2006 General Sonthi, who is leader of one of the smaller 
opposition parties. Nevertheless, the bill is regarded by the DP and PAD on the 
one hand and some redshirt-groups on the other as a door-opener for an elite 
bargain between Thaksin, who is sentenced with a two year jail term because the 
mentioned land sale, and some of his adversaries. DP and PAD claim that the 
real objective of the bill is to allow him to return home as a free man and 
possibly getting his frozen assets back, while also many redshirts and some PTR 
MPs close to them see the move as a betrayal of justice.141) Beside this main 
battlefield there had also been tensions between government and CC when some 
redshirts and government MP’s proposed for the discussion of a new constitution 
to abolish the Constitutional- and the Administrative Court and to reduce the 
number of the independent constitutional organisations to the minimum necessary.142) 
Meanwhile the PAD started a protest campaign in the end of April 2012 claiming 
that the amendment was to topple the “democratic regime of government with the 
King as Head of state” and demanding the Constitutional Court through the Office 
of the Attorney-General (OAG) to stop the amendment effort according to Sect. 
68 of the Constitution, to dissolve the political parties supporting it, to disqualify 
party leaders and executives from politics for five years and to disqualify all their 
MPs.143) The EC and NCCC received similar requests. The public attention was 
141) See Nick Nostitz, “Reconciliation games”, New Mandala, June 5
th
, 2012, latest accessed 
at http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2012/06/05/reconciliation-games/ on 14/06/2012.
142) See Bangkok Post 29/02/2012.
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very limited and even the PAD which is in favor of dramatic acts mobilized not 
more than a few hundred people to attend the public gathering lead by Maj. - 
Gen Chamlong Srimuang before the government complex where the complaints 
were handled in.144) After a month of tense debate the amendment bill had passed 
the second reading in parliament with 340 votes of support against 101 refusing 
it, when the DP declared to be determined to block at all costs and opted for an 
obstruction policy leading to some “disruptive” actions on 30 May in parliament. 
Outside the PAD gathered around 5000 protesters including PAD leader Sondhi 
Limthonkul, who had announced the showdown to be “the last war”. While the 
police were given strict orders to use only shields and avoid any violence the DP 
declared their support for the PAD and some DP MPs came out of parliament to 
visit the protesters. The next day, on 31 May, the PAD surrounded and blocked 
the parliament preventing MPs from entering and finally forced a closing down of 
the session. At the legal front some people, including one Senator and three MPs 
of the DP, filed a complaint against the bill based on Sect. 68, but this time 
directly to the CC. On the same 1 June the CC ordered a temporarily injunction 
ordering the parliament to suspend the third and last reading of the charter 
143) Section 68 Const. 2007 stipulates: 
No person shall exercise the rights and liberties prescribed in the Constitution to 
overthrow the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State 
under this Constitution or to acquire the power to rule the country by any means 
which is not in accordance with the modes provided in this Constitution. 
In the case where a person or a political party has committed the act under 
paragraph one, the person knowing of such act shall have the right to request the 
Prosecutor General to investigate its facts and submit a motion to the Constitutional 
Court for ordering cessation of such act without, however, prejudice to the institution 
of a criminal action against such person. 
In the case where the Constitutional Court makes a decision compelling the political 
party to cease to commit the act under paragraph two, the Constitutional Courtmay 
order the dissolution of such political party. 
In the case where the Constitutional Court makes the dissolution order under 
paragraph three, the right to vote of the President and the executive board of 
directors of the dissolved political party at the time the act under paragraph one has 
been committed shall be suspended for the period of five years as from the date the 
Constitutional Court makes such order.
144) See Bangkok Post 27/04/2012. 
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amendment bill which was scheduled for June 5 until a review of its constitutionality. 
The order was given without any substantial reasons and caused on unfolding 
constitutional crisis. On Saturday June 2, the DP held a rally to support the court 
order145), while the red-shirts organized mass protests with some thousands 
supporters who received a phone call from Thaksin who apologized for his 
attempts to bargain with the opposite elite. While the rallies were going on all 12 
military, civilian and police intelligence agencies have been ordered to monitor the 
events on an order from the government, a move said to silence rumors of a 
possible military coup, which had been circulated among redshirt supporters and 
media.146) Indeed such rumors of a new military coup came up since the PAD 
managed it to close down parliament and the DP obstructed the session from 
inside.147) Prior the 2006 coup the pattern have been similar, with the DP refusing 
to join the parliamentary game, while mass protests of the PAD were used to 
urge the armed forces to “putsch” or the King to intervene by appointing an 
interim government based on the mentioned Sect. 7 Const. 1997 and 2007. 
Against this background, the order of the CC to halt the third reading was 
considered by government MPs and redshirts as “another coup”, a “silent-” or 
“judicial coup d’etat”,148) attempting to topple a popularly elected government in 
the same way the court did with the governments of Samak Sundaravej and 
Somchai Wongsawat in 2008. In the background influential persons were supposed 
to lobby parties in the coalition government to support a new government after 
the dissolution of the governing party for the case the parliament would continue 
the third reading ignoring the court order, promising them “grade A” ministries in 
a new cabinet. Additionally they claimed that DP and PAD had been in contact 
with senior military officers to carry out the plot to topple the government. These 
rumors were fueled by a meeting of the army commander with the heads of the 
army units on the morning of June 1, who then chaired another meeting with 
145) See The Nation 03/06/2012.
146) See The Nation 02/06/2012.
147) See Bangkok Post 06/06/2012.
148) See Bangkok Post 04/06/2012 and 03/06/2012, also for the following.
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colonels in the afternoon of the same day, accompanied by an order to transfer 67 
colonels, reminding some observers of the transfer of 179 colonels prior to the 
2006 coup.149) The rumors prompted the Defence Minister to cut short his 
attention at the Shangri La Dialogue, an annual international security forum in 
Singapore to return to Thailand on June 1, two days ahead of schedule.150) 
  It was this background against which parliament and CC tried to mark or 
respectively find their positions. At Tuesday, June 5, the president of the House 
announced that he had decided to put off the debate, as the court had ordered. He 
explained that this was not an easy decision for him to make as on the one hand 
he was aware that the decisions of the CC according sect. 216 of the 2007 const. 
are final and binding on all state organizations, while on the other hand obeying 
the court’s order to delay deliberations caused the risk to delay the final reading 
beyond the stipulated 15-day period specified in section 291 of the constitution 
dealing with amendments.151) Nevertheless against fierce protests from members of 
his own party and most of the redshirts he decided to comply, stating “in fact I 
disagree with the court order but for the sake of reconciliation, I will step back. I 
also do not want this matter to be used in seeking Pheu Thai’s dissolution.”152) 
On the other side the court’s president spoke up, defending the order, being 
assisted by the DP which declared that, if the government continued trying to 
push through the amendment bill, the DP would file another complaint to the 
Constitution Court under articles 154 and 7 Const. The latter has been introduced 
already; the other stipulates that, if no less than a tenth of the total members of 
both Houses file a petition with the Constitution Court, the prime minister has no 
option but to delay the process of seeking Royal endorsement for the respective 
bill. The leader of the DP’s legal team also concretized which issues the party 
would raise before the CC in the case the government would continue with its 
plan. According to this statement the present constitution would only allow 
149) See Bangkok Post 06/06/2012.
150) See ibid.
151) See Bangkok Post 07/06/2012.
152) Cited in The Nation 06/06/2012.
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amendments but not to rewrite an entire new constitution. This is leading to the 
conclusion that the making of a new constitution is implicitly a violation of the 
constitutional basic structure. This understanding is supported by the party’s 
statement that the House would not have the authority to assign a Constitution 
Drafting Assembly. A last argument pertained to a lack of public hearings on the 
issue.153)
  A backlash for the point of view of DP and CC was the decision of the 
Attorney General’s Office on Thursday, June 7, that the changes achieved by the 
amendment bills would not aim at overthrowing the “democratic regime of government 
with the King as Head of State.” Therefore, the Attorney-General decided not to 
forward the petitions to the Constitutional Court.154) One day later the CC called 
on Parliament to promise that they would add another clause to ensure that the 
writing of a new constitution would not result in reduced power for the Constitutional 
Court or changes in the country’s political system or form of government, as had 
been feared by opponents of the charter-change bill.155) In the meanwhile red-shirt 
group filed a petition to the Senate after gathering 20.000 signatures to support an 
impeachment (according to Section 270) of the seven Constitution Court judges 
who had voted to issue the order against the parliament156). Moreover, a government 
MP who had also declared that the 2013 Budget Bill might cut the high court’s 
non-essential expenditures such as those on security services.157) About 800 
supporters of the CC meanwhile gathered to show their support for the CC 
judges.158)
  According to the legal assessment of the court’s order it is noteworthy first, 
that it seems that the order itself did not contain any reason neither for the 
urgency of the court’s action nor according to the claimed violations of the 
“democratic regime of government with the King as Head of state”. Arguments 
153) See The Nation 06/06/2012.
154) See The Nation 08/06/2012.
155) See The Nation 09/06/2012.
156) See Bangkok Post 07/06/2012.
157) See The Nation 08/06/2012. 
158) See Bangkok Post 09/06/2012.
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have been issued later in press conferences by the court´s speaker and later also 
by the president of the CC while criticism was issued via newspapers, seminars 
and at the stage of red-shirt protests. Before the reasons given by and in support 
of the court shall be analyzed it is useful to have a look on the criticism of the 
order first. 
  One of the arguments often heard by political adversaries of the CC is that the 
order is an unconstitutional violation of the principle of separation of powers, an 
unconstitutional interference in the parliament’s competences. This argument is 
ventilated in different variations from calling on parliamentary supremacy to an 
exemption of amendments from review.159) While the first variation is informed 
by British constitutional thinking and effectively baseless for the Thai constitution, 
the second argument is informed by French legal thinking160) but also not 
supported by the Thai constitutionalism: if there is a restriction of amendments in 
a constitutional system which provide for a strong guardian with wide review 
powers exactly for the purpose to preserve and protect that part of the constitution 
which is exempted from amendments, the review of amendments is arguably 
covered by the review power of the CC in teleological and systematical 
interpretation. A violation of the separation of powers concerning the review of 
amendments therefore is not convincing. However, the concrete application of 
Sect. 68 on the present case seems to be more problematic. A weak argument 
insofar is the statement that the court does not have any authority to issue the 
injunction because this procedural competence is not provided by the constitution 
and constitutional procedure law.161) The fact that the CC had to apply the 
respective provisions of the Civil Procedural Code to issue the injunction seems 
not problematic. If a CC is supposed to be a strong guardian of the constitution 
and questions pertaining to the basic structure of the constitution are at stake the 
159) See Bangkok Post 07/06/2012.
160) The French Constitutional Council decided to have no review powers on laws approved 
by referendum expressing the democratic aspect of the sovereign power. See CC Nr. 
62-20 DC, November 1962, Rec. p.15, consideration No. 2; CC Nr. 92-313 DC, 
September 23 1992, Rec. p.94, consideration No. 2.
161) See Bangkok Post 07/06/2012.
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court must have means for immediate response. If they are not provided for by 
the relevant law, a legal gap has to be assumed. The gap was unintentional as the 
enactment of a suitable procedural law was delayed. The Civil Procedural Code 
delivers insofar a suitable reference for analogy according to general principles as 
laid down in the Civil and Commercial Code, Sect. 4. 
  More convincing are four other arguments, two pertaining to the concrete 
application of the instrument of temporarily injunction, two pertaining to the 
interpretation of Sect. 68. 
  Concerning the latter, the question is firstly who is an eligible applicant to 
demand redress from the CC as the suit was launched directly by private individuals 
without mediation of the Office of the Attorney General (OAG). Secondly it is 
questionable who is a suitable addressee of protective measures by the CC as 
Sect. 68 regulates measures against the misuse of civil rights of the Thai people 
and not the exercise of state power. The wording of Sect. 68 the wording seems 
to state clearly that persons knowing about acts to overthrow the “democratic 
regime of government with the King as Head of State” have the right to request 
the Attorney General to investigate facts and submit a motion to the CC. This 
indicates a two-tier procedure. Since the applicants in the present case were going 
straight to the court instead there seems indeed a violation of the proper 
procedure which counts the more as the OAG meanwhile announced not to have 
any objections against the amendment. 
  The second question if the president of the House is a suitable addressee of 
measures according Sect. 68 seems also to be founded as the constitution refers to 
cases where a person or a political party exercises the rights and liberties 
abusively. The norm closes the catalogue of individual liberties and rights in 
chapter III (Sections 26-69) of the constitution, whereas lawmaking is the official 
duty of the parliament as an emanation of state power.162)  
  Beside this argument against the application of Sect. 68 also the general rules 
to issue an injunction seem to be critical. The CC refers to Sect. 264 Civil 
162) This is the point of view for instance of Worachet Pakeerut; see Bangkok Pundit 
06/06/2012.
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Procedural Code which is a kind of catchall-element for injunctions demanding 
according to Sect. 255 that the court shall grant “any application […] when it is 
satisfied that the plaint has a good cause and has sufficient ground for applying 
the protective measures.” As there are legal remedies against the injunction order 
according to Sect. 261 it is evident that the presence of the conditions required 
has to be comprehensible on a prima-facie basis. Moreover, as the injunction 
intervenes in a core competence of the parliament and contains severe charges the 
requirements are inclined to be strict from a general point of legal and constitutional 
consideration. According to this background the opinion that the case did not 
require any urgent attention of the CC weighs heavy163) and it is convincing as 
the CC by interfering in the reading procedure of a bill is deviating from the 
normal procedure of a- priori review which according to Sect. 154 starts after any 
bill has been approved or reaffirmed by the National Assembly before the Prime 
Minister presents it to the King for signature. Dubious is what “sufficient ground 
[…] protective measures” existed as “the charge that moves are under way to 
overthrow the constitutional monarchy must be backed up with credible evidence 
and not just pure suspicion, speculation or perception, to lend any credence to the 
court’s decision to accept the petitions for consideration.”164) 
  Even constitutional law professors not known to be close to the government 
expressed their opinion that the amendment was in line with constitutional 
requirements and that even if it leads to a whole new charter this would not be 
possible to be considered as an attempt to overthrow the “democratic regime of 
government with the King as Head of State”.165)  
  What are now the arguments of the CC and its supporters? According to the 
application of Sect. 68 the CC expressed the opinion that the norm does not 
demand that a petition has to be filed necessarily to the Attorney General who 
then decides to request action from the CC but that both can directly address the 
163) See The Nation 08/06/2012.
164) Bangkok 07/06/2012. 
165) See Prinya Thewanarumitkul, vice rector of Thammasat University, cited in Bangkok 
Post 07/06/2012.
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CC. Being confronted with the wording of the constitution the CC explained that 
the English translation of the constitution would make the court’s interpretation 
more understandable.166) This argument was hardly convincing. It was not 
methodologically and as the Report on the Meeting of the Assembly for the 
Drafting of the Constitution and the CC’s own webpage and information booklet 
mentioned for procedures according to Sect. 68 only the Attorney General as 
eligible applicant.167)  
  Substantially the court’s president clarified the rationale of the order due to the 
possibility of a future attempt to overthrow the “democratic regime of governance 
with the King as Head of State” with the new constitution to be made according 
to the amendment bill. Thus, so did the president argue, even if the advocates of 
an amendment insisted that the sections of the present constitution on the 
monarchy would not be touched by the new constitution, the amendment bill did 
not explicitly stipulate that the relevant provisions in the present Const. would to 
be spared out.168) This argument seems to be not unproblematic concerning the 
question of the binding of a future constitution-maker who is not constituted yet 
and for which the present parliament seems to be the wrong addressee. In fact, 
the president of the CC formulates the mandate of the CC not as one to review 
the present amendment according to its legal content and quality but to control the 
intention of the law maker. According to him the objective of the inquiry initiated 
with the temporarily injunction wa indeed “to find out from the bill framers 
whether they have ill intentions.” The mere accusation of an attempted overthrow 
166) See http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1338950650&grpid=&catid=03&subcatid= 
0305, latest accessed 14/06/2012.
167) See Report on the Meeting of the Assembly for the Drafting of the Constitution, No. 
27/2550. Several justices seem to have attended the respective meeting of the drafting 
assembly, see Bangkok Post 11/06/2012. See also Office of the Constitutional Court, 
A Basic Understanding of the Constitutional Court of the Kingdom of Thailand, p.41. 
Meanwhile the CC accepted for consideration a petition filed by a former senator 
also directly to the CC to rule whether the Democrat Party-led coalition government 
under Abhisit Vejjajiva had assumed power over the country’s administration by 
unconstitutional methods referring to the legally other protected good under Sect. 68 
beside the “democratic regime”. See Bangkok Post 13/06/2012.
168) See Bangkok Post 03/06/2012.
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of the “democratic regime of government with the King as Head of state” and the 
- not very much substantiated - possibility of such an attempt is enough to launch 
an inquiry of the CC, to take preventive measures against the lawmaker and to 
put the burden of proof on him: “As charged, the court deems it may be possible 
that there is a bid to overthrow the administration for another form of administration. 
Hence, we have to listen to the accused” who, once under suspicion, has to be 
treated with all necessary distrust: “Do the media believe that the accused will 
make a confession that they intend to change the administrative system?” Non- 
compliance with the investigative measures of the court comes close to a plea of 
guilty: “[…] if the accused refuse to defend themselves, how can the court think 
otherwise?”169) 
  Concerning the urgency of the issue the court spokesman declared that the 
escalating political tension had forced the Constitution Court to take swift actio
n170), what prompts the general question for which purpose the CC raised Sect. 
68, to calm down political tensions to prevent an immediate threat to the present 
constitutional concept of governance. Among the few constitutional law professors 
speaking up in favor of the decision the statements of a former rector of 
Thammasat University are significant. According to the urgency which normally 
should be required for a temporarily injunction he declared:
The verdict has not been made and so the binding effect is very limited. The 
parliament can act against the injunction but it must face up to the responsibility. 
If parliament votes to pass the bill in its third reading, it will be proposed to His 
Majesty the King for endorsement. The parliament should avoid subjecting the 
head of state to a situation where he will be burdened with considering an issue 
which could invite extreme social and political conflicts.171) 
  This assessment reflects the required respect of the King but also reveals the 
problem of an injunction on grounds of urgency in the given situation. This 
169) Cited in Bangkok Post 11/06/2012.
170) See Bangkok Post 02/06/2012.
171) Surapol Nitikraipot, cited in Bangkok Post 09/06/2012. 
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counts the more as the former rector also made clear that the court’s injunction 
“had a tremendous impact, as it lays down standard practice for safeguarding the 
constitution and precedents regarding decisions made under Section 68.”172)
  A certain tendency to generalize the vague wording of Sect. 68 becomes 
striking in his overall interpretation of Sect. 68, stating that “it entrusts the 
Constitution Court with the duty to protect the supreme law of the country. The 
court has the legal authority to stop the actions of anyone who exercises his or 
her rights and freedoms in a way that adversely affects the charter. […] If the 
legislature drafts a law which contravenes the constitution, the Constitution Court 
reserves the power to declare such a law a violation of the charter.” The equation 
of “overthrowing the democratic regime of government with the King as head of 
state” as stated in Sect. 68 (1) with “actions of anyone who exercises his or her 
rights and freedoms in a way that adversely affects the charter” seems not 
unproblematic, widening the scope of application of Sect. 68 significantly.
  Interesting is also the statement on the procedural problems for an injunction 
filed directly with the CC. The former rector obviously disagrees with the 
interpretation of the CC’s president clarifying that “the section requires petitions 
[…] to be submitted to the attorney-general, who investigates the action. Drafters 
of the constitution did not wish for the Constitution Court to initiate the 
investigation process itself.” But:
The point to ponder is how one can interpret the letters and the spirit of the 
constitution. What had the constitution drafters intended when they wrote the 
charter? Or do we need to stick to the charter writers’ intentions in interpreting 
laws despite the changing circumstances? […] In this case, the Constitution Court 
interpreted [the constitution] differently from the way the charter writers had 
intended, which was for the petitions to be filed with the attorney-general. But 
the words of the constitution state that the court safeguards the charter. This is a 
big deal involving a redraft of the entire constitution. The court determines that if 
parliament had gone ahead with passing the amendment bill in its third reading, it 
could have created problems.173) 
172) Ibid. 
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  This means that neither the intention of the writers nor the wording of Sect. 68 
is decisive for its application but the purpose to entrust the CC with a powerful 
weapon against anyone who wishes to cause problems for the constitutional 
system. This interpretation is so vague and determined at the same time that it 
creates the universal constitutional weapon. 
  All in all, these arguments and counter-arguments are not only revealing a 
fundamental constitutional crisis (even if there will be probably no immediate 
coup d´état) but also a clear understanding of function and role of the CC by 
those who are acting affirmatively according to the present constitution and the 
CC’s order supposed to preserve it. 
  Expression of the constitutional crisis, which is already an institutional crisis of 
constitutional review in Thailand, is the difficult question for those who are 
considering the CC’s order as an evident miscarriage of justice, how to deal with 
the order in the light of Sect. 216 which deems decisions of the CC as final and 
binding to all state organs. While some scholars seem to have suggested that Sect. 
216 refers only to decisions and not to orders of the court,174) what seems less 
convincing, the president of the parliament enforced his decision to halter the 
amendment according to the court’s order against strong pressure from his own 
party.175) On the other hand, the threat to the institution of the CC represented by 
the drafting of a new constitution remains even more realistic if it eventually 
comes to the making of a new charter. 
  The role the CC assumes seems to be meanwhile that of an institution vested 
with far reaching constitutional police rights commanding an investigative mandate 
on demand of any concerned citizen responding also to ‘bad intentions’ and being 
equipped with an impressive arsenal. Additional to the power to eliminate every 
political force, be it a political party or an individual politician, on formal grounds 
the CC meanwhile commands far reaching powers to eliminate any legislation on 
suspicion if it could be directed against the governing concept of governance. The 
173) Ibid. 
174) See Bangkok Pundit 06/06/2012.
175) See Bangkok Post 12/06/2012.
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specific use of temporarily injunctions as it became standard now completes this 
combined police and censor power amounting to an influence on the political 
order which seems unique for CCs. In the same time the Thai CC is still very 
much dependent on the backing of those who support the governance concept the 
court is duly enforcing. 
E. Conclusion
  Generally it may be said, that the influence of constitutional jurisprudence on 
law and politics provided by the CCs and the Tribunal, can hardly be described 
as a steady stimulus for the development of Thai constitutionalism. The latter 
hardly received any impact in favor of a dynamic process of differentiation and 
elaboration of a consistent legal system, the dogmatic doctrine on constitutional 
law or the people’s trust in the constitution. However, Thai CCs always functioned 
as an important corrective mechanism, rarely surprising the observers with their 
decisions in an environment which was marked in the first peiod by a strong 
populist rule and then by heavily competing concepts of constitutionalism and a 
deeply divided society. In both periods there was not too much space left for a 
CC acting as a self-empowering key player in constitutional life but at best for 
the performance of duties of a strenuous contributor to variations of Thai-style 
democracy.
